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Abstract 
The Kyoto commitment period has come to an end in 2012, and new discussions have started on 
how the new commitment period and its market mechanism will be shaped. It seems like the CDM 
will continue to exist in the future, either as a parallel system to the new one, or as an integrated 
part. The thesis addresses how the CDM’s environmental integrity and the uneven country 
participation to the mechanism can be enhanced. The research focuses on the UNFCCC 
methodology tool to calculate the emission factor of an electricity system, which is used to 
calculate baseline emissions by the largest share of CDM projects. The tool is here used to 
calculate the national and a regional grid emission factors for the Central American countries of 
Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama. 
The analysis in the thesis shows how the methodology tool, made with a specific project-by-
project rationale cannot be applied to historical national electricity generation averages, with 
increasing transnational electricity exchanges. By allowing the inclusion of emissions related to 
electricity imports and not exports, the tool results in a potential excessive issuance of carbon 
credits for emission reductions that will not occur in reality.  
The increased interconnection between national electricity systems poses new challenges for the 
methodology tool, which will have to be reformed and refined to prevent an excessive issuance of 
CERs. In addition, different ways in which the tool can be shaped to calculate baseline emissions, 
to ensure a higher environmental integrity, will have different impacts on the potential carbon 
finance generation in different countries. On the other hand, accurate grid emission factor 
calculations carry large transaction costs, and require a large amount of data which is not available 
for project developers in many countries. This becomes a barrier for increased access and equal 
country participation to the CDM. These factors illustrate the complexity of the problem of how 
CDM compliance rules and procedures for calculating grid emission factors should be shaped.  
By drawing on examples from other countries and regions, and guided by theory on transnational 
climate governance, the thesis presents an alternative CDM governance structure for renewable 
energy grid connected projects, to lower transaction costs, and ensure a higher accuracy of 
baseline calculations.  
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Introduction 
Climate change is now widely recognized as the major environmental problem facing humanity. 
The roots of the problem lies in the way our societies have been built and the way they work. By 
the introduction and utilization of fossil fuels, parts of the world have experienced an explosive 
growth and increase in wealth, but the very resources our wealth is built upon are getting scarce 
and their cumulative greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) are threatening our future. The expected 
changes in temperature, precipitation patterns and rise in sea level will affect all aspects of the 
Earth’s ecosystem, from the smallest plankton in the sea, to mountain glaciers in the Himalayas, 
with adverse impacts on food crops, fresh water resources, and biodiversity (IPCC 2007: 11).  
The first step to address climate change on a global scale came with the United Nations 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. THE UNFCCC called for the widest common, but 
differentiated national efforts, to respond to the threat of climate change (UNFCCC, 1992: 1). The 
Convention noted that most GHG emissions originated in developed countries, and that these 
countries would have to take the initial responsibility to reduce their emissions. Developing 
countries, carrying less responsibility, where expected to have other priorities and focus on their 
social and development needs. 
The Kyoto Protocol, the main international treaty designed to reduce GHG, was adopted in 1997 
and came into force in 2005. The Kyoto Protocol classified countries in ‘Annex I’ and ‘non-Annex I’ 
countries - Annex I countries being developed countries that historically have been the most 
responsible for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Most Annex I countries agreed on emission 
reductions targets. Non-Annex I countries were described as developing countries with the need 
to focus on economic growth, and do not have binding targets for emission reduction, according 
to the Kyoto Protocol (UN, 1998: 3).  
It was agreed to use market forces to achieve the climate change mitigation goals of the Protocol 
by establishing emission trading mechanisms. This was done in order to allow Annex I countries to 
meet their emission reduction targets in a flexible manner while bringing compliance costs down. 
Thus, the foundation for a global carbon market was established. Two market based mechanisms 
were established; the Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism for Annex I countries only, and the 
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Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which allows for emission trading between Annex I and 
non-Annex I countries. 
The CDM allows Annex I countries to purchase certified emission reductions (CER), achieved by 
low cost emission reduction activities in developing countries. The mechanism is also meant to 
contribute to sustainable development and technology transfer to the host countries of CDM 
projects. Since developing countries do not have any GHG emission caps the CDM does not 
contribute to global GHG emission reductions per se, but is an offset mechanism where the 
developed country pays for its own emission reduction to take place in a developing country. CDM 
projects are contributing in this way to a flow of finances, from countries in need of cutting 
emissions and where climate change mitigation costs are higher, to countries with no binding 
targets to cut emissions and where climate change mitigation costs are lower.  
Up until today, the CDM has resulted in almost 12.000 CDM projects requested for registration 
(UNEP Risø Centre, 2013). The success in terms of the quantity of CDM projects was unexpected, 
having contributed to three times the emission reductions, than was anticipated when designed 
(Newell & Paterson, 2010: 83). It has generated a total of 1.200 million certified emission 
reductions (CER) (1.200 million ton CO2), and a total value of 12 billion €
1
 (Fenhann, 2013).  
On the other hand, the CDM has been subjected to massive critique. Being a market mechanism, 
where one participant has limits on its emissions, while the other does not, creates uncertainty 
regarding if total emissions actually have decreased (Newell & Paterson, 2010: 129, 133, 134). 
Another critique directed at the CDM is the fact that there is an uneven representation of 
countries in the CDM; China and India hosting the largest proportion of CDM projects, and African 
countries and other regions being underrepresented. 
Since the CDM or parts of it are expected to be present in the upcoming post-Kyoto market 
mechanism, it is important to continue addressing the issue of environmental integrity and 
increased access to the CDM, to enable more efficient climate change mitigation activities in 
developing countries. 
                                                     
1
 Assuming an average of 10€/ton CO2  
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1 Problem Field 
By January 2013, 6.681 (56%) of 11.855 total CDM projects requested for registration were grid 
connected Renewable Energy (RE) projects (UNEP Risø Centre, 2013). Common for all these 
projects is that they have to use the same methodological tool (grid emission factor or GEF tool), 
to calculate the emission reductions the can be accredited to them. This is done by calculating the 
carbon intensity of the different electricity generating sources that are supplying power to the 
national grid; the more carbon intensive the electricity sources are, the higher the GEF. The GEF is 
used to calculate how grid-connected RE additions to the energy mix will displace carbon intensive 
electricity generation. The higher the GEF the more CERs issued for electricity generated by the 
given project. 
The GEF tool sets forward different methods for calculating the GEF depending on the energy mix 
of the electricity system and the accessibility of data. One of the methods (dispatch data analysis) 
enables calculation of the exact amount of dispatched1 carbon intensive electricity at every hour 
of the year. Since this method requires an extensive amount of data and monitoring, and is seldom 
available for many project developers, it has been used by only 3% of grid-connected RE projects 
(IGES, 2013). Other methods use national historical averages on emissions from electricity 
generation, and are less accurate.  
The methodology is repeatedly revised and updated to address new arising issues. For instance, up 
until the 4th version in April 2011, the methodology did not give the option to consider GHG 
emissions related to exchange of electricity between electricity systems. Now the GEF tool 
includes emissions from electricity imports (only from non-Annex I countries), but electricity 
exports are not to be subtracted from the calculations.  
The rationale behind this methodological choice is that a RE project supplying electricity to the 
grid will displace electricity imports, but will not contribute to less dispatch of electricity, and more 
electricity will be available for export. This approach makes sense from a project- oriented 
                                                     
1
 Electricity Dispatch: The operation of a mix of electricity generation facilities to reliably serve consumers. When new 
power facilities are added to the energy mix, the dispatch will change, potentially displacing electricity generation 
from certain facilities. For more information on electricity generation technologies, their operation, costs and 
electricity dispatch see appendix II 
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perspective. On the other hand it lacks the overview of the effect it has on the accumulated 
potential creation of CERs when all projects are summed up. By using national averages, including 
electricity imports without subtracting exports, and not monitoring the actual dispatched 
electricity, the calculations’ accuracy of the emissions that are actually reduced and the amount of 
issued CERs becomes questionable. 
Most CDM projects take the national electricity grids into account for GEF calculations, but 
countries are becoming increasingly interconnected (Haya, 2012: 1-3). When countries exchange 
electricity, and CDM projects include emissions from imports without subtracting electricity 
exports, a double accounting of electricity generation will occur; electricity generation with 
attached CO2 emission calculations. This leads to a potential increase of the number of issued 
CERs, and undermines the environmental integrity of the GEF tool. The implications of the rules 
set by the GEF tool must therefore be re-assessed, taking into consideration electricity 
interconnection in a regional context, and eventually be redesigned to prevent an excessive 
issuance of CERs.  
The potential for an excessive issuance of CERs makes an argument for the need for stricter GEF 
calculation rules and procedures. On the other hand, strict rules and procedures carry transaction 
costs, representing an economic barrier for project developers, especially for smaller projects in 
developing countries (Spalding-Fecher, 2011: 12). Also, project developers often lack the 
necessary data and monitoring capacity, to make accurate calculations on the amount of 
dispatched carbon intensive electricity. High transaction costs can partially explain the lack of 
equitable distribution of CDM projects, with China and India hosting approximately 70% of all CDM 
projects.  
The barrier of high transaction costs makes an argument for the need for simple GEF calculation 
rules and procedures, to enable an increased and equitable access to the CDM. Simpler 
compliance rules would on the other hand potentially undermine the environmental integrity of 
the CDM, as it is expected that there will be a trade-off between transaction costs and 
environmental integrity (Michaelowa, 2012: 6). This is not necessarily the case since there might 
be solutions for lowering transaction costs for project developers, while maintaining a high 
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environmental integrity of the CDM through a more efficient governance of CDM compliance 
procedures. 
RE project developers investing in grid connected generation projects, operate in a sector where a 
large number of stakeholders are involved. They can be private and public entities, power 
producers, transmission line owners and operators, legislators, and governmental ministries. 
These stakeholders combined possess a vast amount of capacity and access to information that is 
larger than that of a single RE project developer.  
The amount of stakeholders and data increases even more in a system with a prominent amount 
of interconnection and electricity exchange between countries. At the same time the governance 
complexity of a system increases with the amount of stakeholders involved. There must therefore 
on one side be many opportunities for information sharing and provision of GEF calculation 
services to lower transaction costs and capacity barriers for CDM project developers; on the other 
side the increased complexity in such a system requires an increased coordination between 
stakeholders in the governance of RE grid connected CDM projects. 
1.1 The Central American Region as a Case Study for the GEF Tool  
The chosen case to address the above discussed challenges and opportunities is the Central 
American Region, with the countries of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama. Throughout this thesis, the terms ‘the Central American Region’ 
or ‘the region’ are used to refer to these eight countries collectively.  
The countries in the region are experiencing increasing levels of interconnection between their 
national electricity systems. A transmission line project of 1.788 km, the Sistema de Interconexión 
Eléctrica para América Central (SIEPAC) is close to its completion, and will connect the electricity 
systems of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. In 2009 an 
interconnection between Mexico and Guatemala was established, and Mexico and Belize are 
already highly interconnected.  
The interconnection between the countries will increase efficiency in electricity generation and 
consumption, improve security of supply, introduce competition into domestic markets, allow 
 electricity generation projects to achieve economies of scale, and crea
electricity generation (ECA, 2010: 15, 22). 
 
The figure illustrates the geographical boundary of the case study, the Central American Countries 
with Belize and Mexico. Columbia is depicted but not included
The CDM can be used as a source of carbon finance that might contribute towards a low
electricity generation in the region. But, as already mentioned, the increased interconnecti
brings forward specific issues related to the calculation of GEFs. The GEF tool’s potential excessive 
issuance of CERs, caused by only the inclusion of electricity imports and not the net import needs
to be addressed. A reformed GEF tool 
project developers must therefore be formulated
Concerning the transaction cost barrier of GEF calculations, the increased interconnection 
between the countries opens up new opportunities to increase the 
compliance procedures. The benefits of power integration, the increased interconnection between 
the countries, and the construction of the 
stakeholders, and created new institutions to s
The main parties involved in the transmission of electricity in the region include: the governments 
of the respective countries; the transmission, system and market operators in each country; the 
Mercado Eléctrico Regional (MER), the regional competitive electricity market at a supranational 
level; the Empresa Proprietaria de la Red (EPR), which is a consortium of both public and private 
te an incentive for RE 
 
Figure 1 Map of Central America 
 
 in the Central American R
which also prevents increases in transaction costs for 
.  
efficiency of the CDM 
SIEPAC project has brought together a series of 
upport the transmission scheme. 
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companies from Central America, Mexico, Colombia and Spain, established to own, operate and 
lead the construction of the SIEPAC project; the Ente Operador Regional (EOR), which directs and 
coordinates the operation of the regional power system in the SIEPAC, and administrates the MER; 
and The Central American Integration System (SICA), the institutional framework of Regional 
Integration in Central America, which has been a central actor in promoting power integration in 
the region, and was created by the states of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, where Mexico has the role as observer,  (ECA, 2010: 17, 18, 34; 
EOR, 2013; EPR, 2012b).  
Between all these actors operating at the national and supranational levels, information flow and 
cooperation is essential to allow the interdependent functions of power generation, electricity 
exchange and electricity markets to function efficiently. These actors’ capacity could provide 
substantial support in accumulating and sharing the information needed to produce consistent 
GEF calculations that ensure the environmental integrity of CDM projects while minimising 
transaction costs for CDM project developers in the region.  
CDM Project developers have the responsibility to establish a GEF for a given CDM project, but as 
mentioned above, they are not necessarily the actors with the best prerequisites to perform this 
task in an efficient way. This enables a discussion of the need for better governance of GEF 
calculations for grid connected RE CDM projects, by a change of the GEF calculation rules to 
ensure environmental integrity for the CDM. At the same time it gives the opportunity to 
investigate how a change in GEF calculation procedures, the functions and responsibilities 
between actors at the local, national, and supranational level, can lower transaction costs for 
project developers, and ease CDM project implementation. 
The above considerations lead to the following research question: 
1.2 Research Question: 
How can CDM compliance rules and procedures for calculating GEFs be reformed and refined, to 
prevent excessive issuance of CERs and lower transaction costs for CDM project developers in the 
Central American Region? 
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1.2.1 Secondary Questions 
In order to answer the research question, the following secondary questions are used to steer this 
thesis’ empirical research and the analysis of the findings: 
1. How is electricity generated and transported in the region? 
2. Can the available RE sources in the region displace fossil fuels? 
3. What can be deducted from the GEF calculations? 
4. How can an excessive issuance of CERs be prevented? 
5. How can transaction costs of GEF calculations be minimised through better governance? 
1.2.2 Project Design 
Figure 2 Project Design 
 
The figure illustrates the project design i.e. the process of answering the research question 
The project design illustrates the process of analysing the issues presented in the problem field, 
and elaborated in chapter 4, aiming to answer the research question. As shown by the figure, the 
process consists in empirical research in chapter 5, answering the first two secondary questions, 
and establishing a base for the GEF calculations in chapter 6. Chapter 6 presents the GEF 
calculations, answers the third and fourth secondary questions by presenting how the current GEF 
tool allows for an excessive creation of CERs, and how the tool could be revised to prevent this. 
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Chapter 7 answers the last secondary question by analysing how the involved stakeholders and 
transnational networks in RE grid connected projects in the region, can assume different functions 
to ensure a better governance of GEF calculations. The findings are summarised in chapter 8. The 
methodology chapter explains the approach to data collection, and explains the tools used in the 
analysis. Chapter 3 provides the theoretical tools to understand the functions of market 
mechanisms and the issues surrounding the CDM, while providing the tools to analyze how the 
issues can be addressed, leading to the thesis’ conclusion.  
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2 Methodology 
The different methods to calculate GEFs are presented in this chapter, followed by a discussion on 
the choice of GEF calculation method in the thesis. The methodology discussion provides insight 
on the impact different calculation methods have on the possible CER acquirement for grid 
connected RE projects.  The chapter further presents the methodological approach to empirical 
data collection on the respective countries’ electricity sectors and energy sources, on which the 
GEF calculations are based upon. The approach on data collection for the expected development 
of electricity demand and RE potential in the region is then presented, to justify the assumption 
used in the calculations, that all emissions from electricity generation represent potential emission 
reductions and CER creation. Lastly, the chapter presents the approach used to explore how an 
alternative CDM governance of CDM procedures, provided by cases from other countries and 
regions, can contribute to minimise transaction costs for project developers. 
2.1 Grid Emission Factors 
The first part of the analysis in chapter 6, the calculation of the national and regional GEFs, is done 
using the UNFCCCs methodology tool, the tool to calculate the emission factor for an electricity 
system (GEF tool). The tool gives specific guidelines on how the GEFs are calculated, and how to 
identify the relevant electricity system of a given project. The GEF tool and how it is applied will be 
presented in the following sections. 
2.1.1 Identification of the Relevant Electricity System 
The first step in the tool is to identify the relevant electricity system, defined by the spatial extent 
of the power plants that are connected through transmission and distribution lines, and that can 
be dispatched2 without significant transmission constraints (UNFCCC, 2012: 7). In the calculation 
of the national GEFs, the national electricity systems are identified as the relevant electricity 
systems. When calculating the regional GEF in this thesis, the national electricity systems 
connected through the SIEPAC, plus Mexico and Belize will be identified as one electricity system.  
                                                     
2
 For more information on electricity dispatch, see appendix II. 
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There is only one CDM project, that the author is aware of, that has chosen to define the special 
extent of the electricity system, to include more than one nation3. A methodology submission to 
the UNFCC has though applied for the possibility to use a regional GEF for the Southern African 
Power Pool.  
Usually, when including electricity imports from other countries, the grid of the exporting country 
is defined as a connected electricity system. This means that electricity from power plants in the 
connected electricity system can be dispatched to the relevant electricity system, but there are 
significant transmission constraints (UNFCCC, 2011: 7). It is important to examine if there are any 
significant transmission constraints between the countries, to ensure that the RE generated 
electricity from one country, will actually be able to displace carbon intensive electricity in another 
country. 
The tool presents the following criteria to determine if there are significant transmission 
constraints:  
- In case of electricity systems with spot markets for electricity: there are differences in 
electricity prices (without transmission and distribution costs) of more than 5 percent 
between the systems during 60 percent or more of the hours of the year 
- The transmission line is operated at 90% or more of its rated capacity during 90% percent 
or more of the hours of the year. (UNFCCC, 2012: 7) 
The connected national electricity systems in the region are in the thesis calculated as one 
electricity system. This is done, even though there currently are transmission constraints between 
the national grids, due to differences in electricity prices, and by the fact that the SIEPAC 
transmission line in not fully operational yet. Although, the very scope of the SIEPAC is to allow 
electricity to flow more freely between the countries in the region, the creation of a common 
electricity market, and an equalization of the region’s electricity prices. The price differences are 
projected to decrease, as the national electricity grids will become integrated with the SIEPAC, and 
additional transmission capacity is scheduled for future development of the SIEPAC. 
                                                     
3
 The Dagachhu Hydropower Project in Bhutan supplies electricity to India, and includes the Indian electricity system 
in its GEF calculations. For more information see: http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/DNV-CUK1247228633.76/view 
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2.1.2 Calculation of the Grid Emission Factor 
According to the tool, the GEF is identified by calculating a combined margin (CM) emission factor 
of an electricity system. The CM consists of a weighted average of two emission factors, the 
operating margin (OM) and the build margin (BM). The OM reflects the emission factor of the 
existing power plants, whose current electricity generation would be affected by an additional 
electricity generating activity. The BM is the emission factor referring to the group of prospective 
power plants, whose construction and future operation would be affected by an additional 
electricity generating activity (UNFCCC, 2012: 4).  
The GEF tool presents four options to calculate the OM, the Simple OM, the Simple adjusted OM, 
the Dispatch data analysis OM and the Average OM. A common method is used for all countries in 
the thesis’ calculations, for the sake of uniformity and consistency. The Simple OM excludes the 
calculation of low-cost/must-run4 (LCMR) power plants in its calculation (UNFCCC, 2011: 9-10); 
expecting that these power plants will not be affected by new additions. Excluding electricity 
generation from LCMR power sources usually increases the GEF, as LCMR power source are mostly 
RE. The simple OM method can only be used if LCMR sources constitute less than 50% of the total 
electricity generation. All countries except Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua use more than 50% 
LCMR power sources in their national grids, therefore the Simple OM is not be used in this thesis.  
The Simple adjusted OM is made for electricity systems where more than half of the electricity 
generation comes from RE. The calculations include both LCMR and non-LCMR sources, but 
requires data on the amount of hours LCMR sources operate on their margin5 during the year 
(UNFCCC, 2012: 15-16). This is done because it is assumed that power additions will mostly 
dispatch the power sources that generate electricity above the margin for LCMR power sources. 
This option requires an extensive amount of data that was not accessible for all countries.  
The Dispatch data analysis OM is based on data from the actual dispatched power units, operating 
at their margin during each hour of the year. This option is not applicable to historical data and 
requires annual monitoring (UNFCCC, 2011: 17-19). Since the thesis does not operate with an 
actual electricity generating activity to be monitored, this option is not applicable. This method 
                                                     
4
 Low-cost/must-run typically include hydro, geothermal, wind, low-cost biomass, nuclear and solar generation 
(UNFCCC, 2011: 5). For more information on electricity technologies, see appendix II. 
5
 Maximum capacity 
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governmental bodies, and the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Commission (CEPAL). NCVs 
and CO2 emission factor of fossil fuel types are the ones provided by the 2006 IPCC Guidelines on 
National GHG Inventories, as required by the GEF tool (UNFCCC, 2012: 28).  
When calculating the CM, the weighted average of the OM plus the BM depends on the 
technology used, the development standard of the country in question, and the data availability to 
calculate the BM. For instance, for wind and solar generation project activities, the OM and BM 
are weighted differently, 75% of the OM and 25% of the BM. If the project activity is located in a 
Least Developed Country, a country with less than 10 registered CDM projects, or the data to 
calculate the BM is not available, a simplified CM can be used by applying a BM = 0 (UNFCCC, 
2011: 23-24).  
Since Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Panama have less than 10 registered CDM projects, there 
is no need to calculate the BM for these countries (UNEP Risø Centre, 2013). Data to calculate the 
BM was hard to come by for several countries. For the sake of uniformity and simplicity, all GEF 
calculations in the thesis use a BM = 0. The Average OM will therefore be the only parameter used 
to calculate the GEFs. The thesis’ national GEFs, made with average national and regional 
perspectives will therefore differ from many existing CDM projects’ GEF, where calculations are 
made with an ad-hoc project rationale. 
Complications in GEF Calculations 
For most of the Central American countries, data on fuel consumption and electricity generation 
by fuel is not available. Especially data on natural gas consumption is hard to come by. In some 
cases it is only referred to as thermal power generation, clustered with diesel and fuel oil 
consumption. In the CEPAL, 2012b report, some fuels are listed as “other”, so it is not always 
possible to assess which fuel it is referred to. The share of natural gas generated electricity is 
assumed to be very low in most countries, except for Mexico, where data on natural gas 
consumption is available. There is no data available on Belize’s fuel consumption for electricity 
generation. To calculate the GEF for Belize, the Average OM GEF calculation made from Carqueija, 
2012, has been used as reference for the GEF calculations. 
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Implications of the Choice of Methodology to Calculate GEFs  
The difference between the Average OM and the other methods brings forward different aspects 
of an electricity system. The Average OM gives all power sources an equal weight in the equation. 
Thus, the GEF calculated with the Average OM reflects the average amount of GHG emission per 
MWh from the electricity system. The main scope of GEF tool is although to calculate the GHG 
reductions caused by additions in RE generation activities. The Simple OM and the Simple adjusted 
OM do not reflect actual emissions of the electricity sector. They rather try to reflect how existing 
power generation activities would be displaced by additions in RE generation activities, but still do 
so based on historical averages. The Dispatch data analysis gives a more exact picture of emission 
reductions the project has contributed to, but requires monitoring and access to data that few 
project developers have access to.  
The Impact of Including or Excluding Electricity Exchanges  
To calculate the impact of electricity imports in the calculations, the GEF tool gives a guideline to 
determine the emission factor of electricity imports. The imported electricity from a connected 
electricity system is either calculated to be 0 tCO2/MWh, or the weighted average OM of the 
exporting grid (not if dispatch data analysis OM is used) (UNFCCC, 2012: 8). Project developers can 
be expected to choose the profit maximising option, and will therefore include emissions from 
electricity imports if possible, so the weighted average OM of the exporting countries is used to 
calculate emissions from electricity imports. In the thesis, the calculation on how electricity 
imports affect the national GEFs are done for each reference year, and not on a weighted average 
basis. This further improves the calculations’ accuracy.  
In the thesis, the national GEF calculations are done accounting for national electricity generation, 
for national electricity generation including imports, and for net imports (including imports, but 
subtracting exports). The GEFs without electricity imports are calculated to make an account of 
the total GHG emissions in the respective countries and in the region. The availability of both 
calculations with and without import, gives the opportunity to analyse how a national and a 
regional approach to GEF calculations has an impact on the total CER potential in the region. The 
calculation of net imports gives the possibility to analyse how the national GEFs will change, 
compared to if electricity exchange is not accounted for, having an impact on project developers’ 
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and national interest to choose specific calculation methods if given the option. The different 
calculations set the base for the discussion on how the methodology can be improved to prevent 
an excessive CER creation. 
2.2 RE and CER Potential, Costs, Competitiveness and Influence on Prices   
When calculating the potential CER creation in the region in chapter 6, it is assumed that all fossil 
fuel based electricity generation can be displaced. To assess if this is the case, and potentially still 
be the case in the future, in chapter 5 the RE potential of the region is mapped by assessing the 
hydropower, geothermal and wind power potential in the respective countries, and it is compared 
to the expected increase in electricity demand.  
To evaluate if RE offer an economic reasonable alternative to fossil fuel based electricity 
generation in the region, the respective countries’ own assessments for investment and 
operational costs related to electricity generation are used when available. In the absence of such 
assessments, the World Bank, 2012 report concerning the competitiveness of RE in Central 
America is used. The costs of RE, combined with the GEF calculations, which give the amount of 
CER that can be credited per MWh generated, enables to evaluate how the CDM can influence RE 
prices and their competitiveness. This will enable a discussion on the CDM’s effectiveness as a RE 
incentivising mechanism in the region. 
To determine the countries RE power potential, the most recent and updated data released from 
relevant authorities in the respective countries is used when available. Where national data is not 
available, the ECLAC report on Renewable Energy Sources in Latin America and the Caribbean from 
2004 is used as a reference. The expected power output from the respective technologies in the 
report, is in some cases used to determine the expected power output from newer assessments in 
RE power potential. In the case of wind power, the ECLAC report does not present any power 
output calculation. In this case, existing power output from wind generation in the respective 
countries has been used to calculate the expected output from future generation expansion. In 
the absence of existing wind generation in the country, power output from wind generation in the 
neighbouring countries has been used to determine the expected power output from wind power 
potential.  
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The mentioned approach to power output calculation cannot be considered conservative. Wind 
power projects with the highest potential for power output are usually the first to be constructed, 
having the highest rates of returns of investments. The power output from the following projects 
could therefore be expected to be decreasing, making the accuracy of the expected power output 
questionable. On the other hand, many of the power potential estimations in the ECLAC 2004 
report are considered conservative. This gives the identification of power output potential, a 
certain degree of uncertainty, but should still give an approximation of expected power potential.  
The power output estimations, compared to future expected demand, show if some countries 
have a surplus of supply potential, while others can be expected to experience a deficit of energy 
generation. The increased interconnection between the countries shows how the future deficits 
can be levelled by the surplus in other countries. 
Combining the national GEF calculations with current CER values, enables the calculation of the 
total potential for carbon finance generation in the respective countries. The regional GEF 
calculation enables to see how the countries’ respective CER generation potential will change, 
from the utilisation of a national to a regional GEF, and how the economic incentive to utilize the 
respective countries’ RE resources will change. This lays the foundation for a discussion on how 
different national interests can influence the choice of GEF.  
2.3 Governance Analysis for the CDM in the Region 
The thesis investigates how a better governance of the CDM can provide a higher environmental 
integrity, and increase access to the CDM, by simplifying compliance procedures for project 
developers. To do this, theory on transnational climate governance is used to map the different 
actors involved in the region’s electricity sector, and their respective and potential functions. 
Examples on how other countries and studies have addressed related issues will be used as 
inspiration, for which governance structure might function in the region.  
Especially two cases relate to and contribute with insight to improve the governance of GEF 
calculation compliance procedure. One is the case of the Indian Central Electricity Authority (CEA), 
which performs GEF calculations of the Indian electricity grids (India is a vast country with 
separate but connected electricity systems) (CEA, 2006: S1).  
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The other case is GFA Envest’s Analysis of Grid Emission Factors for the Electricity Sectors in 
Southern Africa. This case calculates a common GEF for the South African Power Pool (SAPP), 
connecting Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In this case, a series of 
barriers are identified, and solutions proposed to improve the governance of the issues arising 
from the SAPP calculations. The case does not address the potential excessive creation of CERs, 
caused by the current GEF methodology, but contributes with information on the different 
involved actors, their respective governance related functions, and issues arising from a change 
from national to transnational GEF application for CDM projects.  
The governance examples are put in relation to the Central American context; the fact that there 
are eight countries involved with eight different CDM Designated National Authorities, that have 
to approve projects; different national interests, caused by the difference in electricity generation 
sources and the availability of RE sources; and the institutional setup of the electricity sector in the 
region. Here, the theory on transnational climate governance is used to analyse the actor’s 
governance functions, and by whom and how the issue of environmental integrity caused by 
excessive CER generation can be solved, and how and by whom the limited access to the CDM, 
caused by the lack of uniformity and high transaction costs can be addressed.  
2.4 Summary 
The methodology chapter presented the methodology used to calculate GEFs. It further presented 
the different methods, including electricity exchanges, used to analyse the different consequences 
of using different calculation methods. The empirical research that has been conducted, to map 
the RE potential and its competitiveness with other power sources, to assess how the different 
GEFs would affect RE and the national interests in GEF calculation was then presented. Lastly, the 
chapter presented the way in which the current governance of the CDM is analysed, and the way 
in which alternative governance models can be developed, using transnational climate governance 
theory, and examples from other countries and regions. 
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3 Theory 
The amount of literature concerning carbon finance is extensive. A selection of literature has been 
used to present the complexity of the issues concerning climate change, and the critique directed 
at the CDM. To address how the GEF tool can be revised, the chapter draws on literature on 
baseline methodologies and how they should be shaped to ensure environmental integrity. The 
literature also presents how transaction costs influence project developers’ access to the CDM.  
Theory on Transnational Climate Governance is used to address how the governance of the 
transnational CDM rules and procedures can be shaped, to make the CDM compliance process 
more efficient. The theory explains the process of climate change governance through 
transnational networks of actors.  
3.1 Economic aspects of Climate Change 
Newell and Paterson, 2010, present the issue of climate change mitigation as a socio-technical 
transformation6 issue, where drivers for change include regulation, technology, market prices, but 
also individuals and supportive corporate cultures (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 58). There is a 
need for a regime shift, to collectively transform from a “carboniferous” society, to a society 
where market forces are structured by a “climate capitalism”, a shift that according to the authors 
is already taking form (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 7, 8, 41, 185).  
Although acknowledging the fact that the way the economy has been organised has led to 
increasing CO2 emissions, and is the main driver of climate change, the authors also look into the 
historical development, and power struggles in the climate change discussion. It is acknowledged 
that the systematic change is mainly driven by market mechanisms, and that although flawed, the 
gravity and urgency of the situation forces us to “work with what we have”, in a learning by doing 
process (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 9, 31).  
3.1.1 Carbon Markets, Globalisation and Neoliberalism 
As the world has seen a shift from hierarchical government, to governance through networks of 
actors, and globalisation and neoliberal logic became dominant, market mechanisms became the 
prevalent tool of choice to contribute to emission reductions (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 23-28). 
                                                     
6
 For more information regarding socio-technical system transition and socio-technical regimes see Geels, 2004; Geels 
2007 and Geels and Kemp, 2007 
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To make carbon markets able to have a substantial effect on climate change mitigation, there 
must be a shift in investments by large-scale financial actors, towards low-carbon investments. To 
enable this, there must be predictable prices for carbon emissions, signalising that investing in 
carbon intensity activities is a risky business (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 76-77).  
Unfortunately, the experiences with mitigation market mechanisms have been mixed. The CDM 
has managed to direct finances from rich countries to developing countries, but mostly to 
economies in transition as Brazil, China and India, while many countries, especially Sub-Saharan 
have been sidelined. Another issue arose from an initial surplus of carbon emission allowances in 
the EU, which linked to the CDM, led to decreasing prices for carbon allowances, influencing (CER) 
prices negatively (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 86,102).  
3.2 Climate Change Mitigation Effectiveness of the CDM 
Even though the CDM has had a series of unexpected successes, having generated more than 215 
billion US$ in private investments in developing countries (CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012: 2), it is still 
uncertain if it provides cheaper emission reductions, without creating new major problems. In 
contrast to an allowance system, where all actors have a limited number of allowances, the CDM is 
a system where one participant has a limit on its emissions, while the other has none (Newell and 
Paterson, 2010: 83). Project developers need therefore to draw an assumptive trajectory of what 
the emissions would have been without the project i.e. the baseline emission, and a 
counterfactual trajectory, where emission reductions from the given CDM project are included. 
Project developers also need to prove that the project would not have taken place without the 
CDM. 
A series of implications arise from this. There is a chance that a double counting of emissions 
reductions might happen, i.e. several CDM projects getting credits for the same emission 
reductions. There is also the issue of ensuring additionality, the risk for CDM projects to be 
credited for emission reductions that would have happened without the CDM.  Since the CDM 
does not contribute to actual net reduction in carbon emissions, it is imperative that CDM projects 
actually reduce the emissions they are credited for. If more CERs are issued than the actual 
emissions are reduced, the CDM will lead to a net increase in total carbon emissions. At the heart 
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of these problems lies the question of baseline methodology (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 133, 
134; Paulsson, 2009: 67-69). 
3.2.1 Baseline Methodologies 
The issues of additionality and baseline credibility are central for the environmental integrity of 
the CDM, thus its legitimacy. When assessing the baseline emissions from an electricity grid, 
several different GEF calculation methods can be used, and the amount of CERs issued may vary 
depending on the chosen alternative. The fact that there are several options to calculate baselines 
for grid connected RE projects, leading to different baseline results, is an acknowledgment that 
baselines are not necessarily accurate. Thus, to ensure the environmental integrity of the CDM, it 
is important to set the baseline in a conservative manner.  
Additionality 
To prove additionality project developers usually have to show that the project would not be 
economically viable without the CER revenue, or that there are certain technology, capacity or 
knowledge barriers that are surpassed thanks to the CDM (UNEP Risø Centre, 2005: 39-35). Even 
though this sounds quite straightforward, additionality testing, which is often qualitative, has 
repeatedly being criticised to be inconsistent and subjective (Spalding-Fecher & Michaelowa, 
2012: 81). There have been a large number of examples where the additionality of CDM projects 
could be questioned (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 115, 134).  
Double Counting 
The issue of double counting can arise in two situations, one is between CDM projects in Annex I 
countries, and the other between Annex I and non- Annex I countries. Between CDM projects in 
Annex I countries, double accounting occurs when two CDM projects gain CERs for the same 
activity. If two CDM projects are credited for displacing the electricity that would have been 
generated using a diesel generator, and their combined amount of generated electricity is higher 
than the electricity generated by the diesel generator, while both projects get CERs for all their 
respective electricity generation, there will be a double count of emission reductions. 
Double counting of emission reductions between Annex I and non- Annex I countries arises from 
the fact that developed countries will partially achieve their emissions reduction targets by 
purchasing CERs from developing countries. Developing countries on the other hand may include 
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CDM related emissions reductions in their national GHG inventory calculations. Since the emission 
reductions from CDM projects are only offsets, thus “belong” to the buyer, the emission 
reductions should not be claimed by both parties.  
Assuming that the international emissions offsets account for a third of emission reductions 
needed by Annex I countries to meet their targets, and these offsets also are accounted for by the 
host countries, global emissions would be 1.3 GtCO2 e higher than we think have been reduced. 
This is without taking into account additionality, and the risk that more CERs are generated, than 
the emissions reduced (UNEP, 2011: 23).  
3.2.2 Demand / Supply Imbalance 
Another issue regarding the CDM is the existing uncertainty over demand. As markets are based 
on the notion of scarcity, the amount of circulating credits must be below the actual level of 
emissions. A higher circulation of CERs would depress carbon prices, as has already been the case, 
bringing CER prices down to below 1€/tCO2, a level that is ineffective to create a substantial 
additional incentive for low-carbon activities. The limited demand for offsets makes an argument 
for the need to restrict the supply of carbon credits (Figueres and Streck, 2009: 232, 234, 241). 
Since the number of credits gained by a project is determined by the baseline methods used for 
the calculations, high baselines will only contribute to an overall increase in global emissions. 
Baselines that are too low, will on the other hand reduce crediting and the economic incentive for 
GHG mitigation projects (Kartha et. al., 2003: 546). 
To provide a higher level of environmental integrity, while taking into account specific national 
circumstances, the development of broadly applicable standardized baselines, was initiated during 
the 15th Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP) in 2009 (Spalding-Fecher & Michaelowa, 
2012:82). This is a step recognizing that there is a need for a better governance of CDM rules and 
procedures. Standardized baseline rules will also ease the access to the CDM for small projects and 
projects in poorer countries, by creating common rules, a fairer competition between carbon 
market actors, higher flow of finances to countries in more need for investments, and higher 
security of investments (CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012: 38-39).  
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3.2.3 Transaction Costs 
Assuming a free and transparent market environment, the price of a CER should be equal to its 
marginal production cost. Additional costs occur when the transaction of CERs from producer to 
consumer include additional costs related to CDM compliance procedures. Therefore, the CER 
price will be higher than the marginal cost of production, leading to a lower demand and lower 
efficiency of the system.  
The transaction costs related to the rules and compliance requirements of the CDM carry a fair 
degree of uncertainty and are not easy to predict (Pan, 2002: 3, 4). The more complicated the 
rules are, the higher the transaction costs and the less project developers which are vulnerable to 
risk will be willing to invest, or the more project investors which do not have the capacity to 
ensure CDM compliance, will have to spend. On the other hand, the rules are put in place to 
ensure the environmental integrity of the mechanism. A balance must therefore be found 
between transaction costs and environmental integrity (Michaelowa, 2012: 6).  
3.2.4 GEF methodologies and the Need for Governance 
An increasing electricity demand in developing countries has resulted in a large number of 
electricity-based CDM projects. This has in its turn resulted in a vast amount of research and focus 
on baselines for these projects. Although the methodology is at its 3rd edition, and has been 
revised 8 times, the CDM still mainly remains an activity-based market mechanism, where 
baselines and additionality are determined at the individual project activity level. Even though the 
projects are being subjected to rigorous checks and balances, established to ensure that the 
emission reductions are additional, correctly monitored and verified, it is imperative to uphold its 
environmental integrity to ensure its legitimacy (Figueres and Streck, 2009: 233,234). As private 
actors have an incentive to overestimate baselines to secure higher profits, it is important to 
ensure that the methodology does not allow an excessive issuance of CERs.  
Even though there is the argument that markets to an extent govern themselves, external 
governance is needed, to enable a market such as the CDM to exist. This includes the need for 
strong rules, elaborate accounting systems and methodologies to prove that a project has 
contributed to emission reductions (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 141). Out of this realization arises 
the issue regarding who gets to make the rules, and who gets to set the baselines. As private 
actors operating within an activity based mechanism i.e. the CDM will strive to maximise profits, it 
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is questionable if these are the ones that should establish the baselines. These issues will be 
discussed in chapter 7. 
3.3 Transnational Climate Governance 
The credibility of a market mechanism depends highly on its governance. The current trade off 
between environmental integrity and transaction costs in the GEF tool, can be minimised by 
making the governance of CDM rules and procedures more efficient. The first step towards 
efficient governance is to allow stakeholders to provide input, in order to increase credibility, 
based on the public availability of information. Rules need to be consistent and applied in an 
unbiased manner, and the participatory system must be transparent and have a clear set of rules 
(Michaelowa, 2012: 6). 
Theory on transnational climate governance stresses the need to understand climate change 
governance from a transnational network governance perspective. This arises from the fact that 
climate politics are affected by an extensive and growing crystallization of cross-border interests 
and coalitions, making it exposed to direct influence and initiatives of non-state actors, bringing 
forth the need for policy coordination vertically, horizontally, and across sectors. This results in 
disaggregated and narrowly delineated climate-related issues as adaptation, carbon markets, 
renewable energy, reporting etc., which are in turn grouped to facilitate collective action across 
borders, within specific governance niches (Andonova et. al., 2009: 57, 58). Here, the issue of RE 
grid connected CDM projects is highlighted as a niche, where a network of actors has specific 
interests, and can influence its governance. 
The transnational network nature of climate change can be clearly seen in how the authority is 
diffused, across different levels of organization actors in multi-actor and multi-level global 
environmental governance. The UNFCCC exemplifies intergovernmental cooperation, national 
governments develop and implement climate policies within national politics and institutions, EU 
countries add an extra layer of regional and supranational governance, and Sub-national 
organisations and NGOs shape public opinion and contribute to the development of new policies 
(Andonova et. al., 2009: 52).  
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The definition of when transnational governance occurs is by the authors defined as “...when 
networks operating in the transnational sphere authoritatively steer constituents towards public 
goals”, meaning that the network’s steering is recognized as authoritative by the individuals and 
organizations that constitute the network (Andonova et. al., 2009: 56). There must therefore be a 
common understanding between stakeholders on where and how authority is delegated. 
3.3.1 Governance Functions 
There are mainly three identified governance functions, in which a network steer members 
towards specific purposes. One is information sharing, the second is capacity building and 
implementation, and the third is rule setting. The kind of function performed by a network 
depends on the resources the network has at its disposal, to yield governance power. Information 
sharing is central to many transnational governance networks, as it can be the main resource to 
steer actors towards the goals of the network (Andonova et. al., 2009: 63). 
Capacity building and implementation is a function performed by networks that provide resources 
as finance, expertise, labour, technology, monitoring etc. to enable action. Here, a pooling of 
resources creates a mechanisms of cooperation, which enables the actors (non-state actors and/or 
local authorities), which traditionally could not perform influence or were inhibited by transaction 
costs. It is a process denoted by negotiation over rights and responsibilities and struggles over the 
nature of the problem and its appropriate solutions. These types of governance activities can take 
place in already agreed-upon intergovernmental or domestic rules and norms, and may seek to 
enhance the capacity of network constituents to implement them (Andonova et. al., 2009: 64,65). 
Rule setting networks contribute to climate change governance, by validating norms and 
establishing rules to guide and constrain actors. In contrast to traditional hierarchical and 
sovereign power, to govern and to set rules and generate compliance, transnational governance 
structures are subject to a different sort of authority, and softer governance tools than law are 
therefore usually used. The rule setting function of transnational governance networks can 
emerge in parallel to existing intergovernmental or domestic rules, or as a substitute in the 
absence of rules in the international or domestic sphere (Andonova et. al., 2009: 64, 65). 
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3.3.2 Public, Private and Hybrid Transnational Networks  
Public transnational governance networks are established by and for public actors. These include 
sub-units of government, legislators or units of intergovernmental organizations, acting quasi 
independently of national decisions. Public transnational networks are usually established through 
soft forms of cooperation, and can involve public authorities across local and global scales 
(Andonova et. al., 2009: 59). In relation to the thesis, the respective countries CDM Designated 
National Authorities (DNA) are seen as sub-units of government, while the CDM Executive Board 
(EB) is an authority on the global scale. 
DNAs are not in a horizontal network structure between countries, but the network is structured 
vertically, being one of the entities approving CDM projects, and one of the links between, 
national priorities (Ministries of Energy) and the EB; the EB being a rule-setting actor in a public 
transnational governance network. The DNA’s governance function is also mainly rule-setting, as it 
sets the sustainability criteria for CDM projects in the respective country, and has the legitimacy to 
approve projects. The DNA can potentially have an information sharing and capacity building 
function, as many DNAs make CDM project inventories, and try to promote CDM project 
opportunities to potential CDM investors, nationally and internationally.  
Private transnational governance networks are networks established and managed by non-state 
actors. The actors operating in the national and regional electricity markets in the Central 
American case constitute an example of a private transnational governance network. Non-state 
actors can establish private, network-based governance systems by bringing together autonomous 
actors, from one or several sectors, in a voluntary alliance who agrees on aligning their behaviour, 
to support private and public goals. The network structure facilitates the alliance and the 
identification of common goals. Private governance networks can create authority and recognition 
through the functioning of markets, by institutionalizing common principles, norms and ideas. The 
collective aspect also reduces the transaction cost of achieving the goals, compared to an 
individual approach (Andonova et. al., 2009: 61).  
Hybrid transnational governance networks emerge when actors from public and private sectors 
establish joint transnational networks with common governance objectives. In the climate change 
arena, these networks have proliferated, also thanks to the merging of market and regulatory 
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instruments in the Kyoto Protocol (Andonova et. al., 2009: 62). The public-private partnership of 
the actors involved in the construction of the SIEPAC project is an example of a hybrid 
transnational governance network, which have common governance objectives. 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented the theoretical tools that are used in the thesis to analyse issues 
presented in the problem field, and answer the research question. Theory on climate capitalism 
presented the rationale behind the choice of using a market mechanism to achieve economic 
efficient climate change mitigation, but also highlighted a series of issues that have arisen from 
the CDM. At the heart of the critique is the fact that the CDM allow countries with emission 
targets to offset their emission in countries with no cap on their emissions. This stresses the 
importance of establishing baselines for CDM projects to ensure that issued CERs correspond to 
actual emission reductions.  
Issues concerning the governance of the CDM have been highlighted. The issues concerning 
methodology, which undermine the environmental integrity of the CDM, has been pointed out as 
an issue that needs to be addressed. Transaction costs, which hinder potential project developers 
who lack capacity, or have higher investment risk, to participate in the CDM have also been 
presented. Finally, the chapter presented the theory on transnational climate governance, which 
gives a theoretical tool to analyse the nature and the functions of the relevant stakeholders in the 
governance of the CDM. 
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4 Introduction to the CDM 
This chapter gives an introduction to the CDM, focusing on the issues addressed by the thesis. The 
development of CER prices during the last years is presented, with a discussion on the reasons 
behind the collapse of CER prices. The issues of additionality, carbon leakage and double counting 
are presented, followed by a description on current developments of the CDM, and possible 
solutions to address these issues. The chapter then addresses the issues of the risk for potential 
excessive issuance of CERs, undermining the legitimacy of the CDM, and the issue of high 
transaction costs for project developers, leading to an unequal access to the mechanism. Lastly, 
the latest development on these issues, discussed during the COPs is presented, to give a picture 
on what can be expected in the future. 
4.1 The Structure of the CDM  
Apart from being an offset mechanism with the aim at contributing to sustainable development in 
developing countries, The Kyoto Protocol established three criteria for the CDM: One is that the 
participation by the host country government to the mechanism and a given CDM projects is 
voluntary, the second is that the projects have to result in real, measurable, and long term 
benefits related to mitigation of climate change, and the third is that the reductions in GHG 
emissions from the CDM project should be additional to any that would occur in the absence of 
the CDM (UN, 1998: 11-12). To assure that the goals of the CDM are achieved, CDM projects are 
subjected to a sequence of procedures, exemplified by the standard lifecycle of a CDM project.  
Figure 3 CDM Project Lifecycle 
 
The figure illustrates the different steps in a CDM project’s lifecycle, established to ensure that the 
projects upholds the goals of the CDM 
The designated national authority (DNA), the host country’s CDM authority, has to approve the 
proposed CDM projects, confirm that the project’s implementation is voluntary, and it contributes 
to sustainable development. The designated operational entity (DOE) is an independent entity 
 that validates CDM project proposals
reductions have taken place. The CDM Executive Board (EB) is
responsible for validation of methodologies, project registration and CER issuance. 
As illustrated, a CDM project needs to go through a complicated process before it can be credited 
CERs for its emission reductions. The system is important to ensure the environment
the CDM, put in place to avoid that en excessive issuance of CERs 
reductions does not take place. On the other hand,
transaction costs for project developers, which con
CDM compliance rules’ efficiency in ensuring that an excessive issuance of CERs does not occur, in 
relation to RE grid connected CDM projects will be 
4.2 The Issue of Unequal Access to the 
High transaction costs and complex governance has been identified as a barrier, limiting access for 
project developers, especially in least developed countries (Michaelowa, 2012: 1). The lack of 
equity in CDM access can be seen by the proportion of CD
Figure 4 Share of CDM Projects Worldwide by Country
The figure illustrates all CDM Projects by country, where Brazil, Mexico, India and China are 
highlighted as a fraction of all projects. Source: UNEP Risø
As illustrated by the figure above, certain countries are overrepresented in CDM participation, 
them all being emerging economies. Complex governance and high transaction costs have 
contributed to the lack of representation of CDM projects in
 against CDM requirements, and verifies that
 the governing body of the CDM, 
compared to real emission 
 this complex process lead to a fair amount of 
stitutes a barrier for CDM participation.
discussed in chapter 6. 
CDM  
M projects by country.
 Centre, 2013 
 many developing countries, lacking 
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 data or capacity to comply with the rules and procedures of the CDM (Platonova
2012: 8). How the governance of compliance to the GEF tool can be made more efficient, to lower 
transaction costs and increase the access to the CDM will be discussed in chapter 7.
4.3 The Price Collapse of CER
The CDM has been effective as an incentive to invest in mitigation projects in developing 
countries. Since it came into force
anticipated, and has generated more than 215 billion US$ in private investments in developing 
countries (Newell & Paterson, 2010: 83; CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012: 2).
supply of CERs compared to demand, has led to a coll
Figure 
The figure illustrates the connection between supply and demand of CERs, leading to a fall in CER 
prices. Source: CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012: 23
The increased amount of CERs available on the market has had an influence on the price. CER 
prices used to reach up to 23€, but are at an all time low of 0,18 € (STX, 2013: 2). This low price 
makes the incentive for RE through the CDM minimal at the moment.
The amount of CERs available on the market is not the
crisis and insufficient reduction commitments, 
for CERs from Annex I countries. The EU, the main source of CER demand
amount of emission allowances (EUA) to its industries, leading to a drop in EUA prices
s 
, it has contributed to three times the CER creation than 
 The downside is that the 
apse of CER prices.  
5 CER Supply and Demand Imbalance 
 
 
 only factor influencing prices. The financial 
contributed to fewer emissions 
, issued an 
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-Oquab et. al., 
 
 
and lower demand 
excessive 
 (Newell and 
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Paterson, 2010: 101-105). Since the EU emission trading scheme is linked to the CDM, the drop in 
EUA price influenced CER prices as well.  
Figure 6 Link between EUA and CER 
 
The figure illustrates the link between the EU trading scheme and the CDM, on how EUA and CER 
prices follow the same pattern. Source: Carbonfinance, 2013 
As illustrated by the above figure, the prices for CERs and EUA are strongly correlated. 
Furthermore, the European countries can only buy a limited amount of CERs, to comply with their 
emission targets, limiting the demand for CERs (Vasa, 2011: 1; Figueres & Streck, 2009: 232). The 
uncertainty concerning the possible end of the Kyoto Protocol by December 2012 also created a 
lot of insecurity on the carbon market (Eco Logic, 2010), making investors uncertain on CER prices 
expectation. The EU has further committed itself to only buy CERs from least developed countries 
in the future, so a further decrease in demand can be expected (UNFCCC, 2012b).  
The above picture illustrates clearly that the CDM is currently an ineffective climate change 
mitigation mechanism. The economic ideology behind the mechanisms in itself is not the problem, 
but when the necessary conditions for trading i.e. measuring instruments, legal institutions etc. 
are inadequate, a market mechanism cannot function efficiently (Newell and Paterson, 2010: 142). 
Above all, this points to the fact that a market cannot function without scarcity.  
This issue has been recognised by the international community, with several actors claiming too 
low ambition on reduction targets, and the lack of linking all Annex I countries’ targets with the 
CDM, currently limiting the number of countries buying CERs (CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012:2). This 
would surely increase demand, but on the other hand would also potentially increase the 
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magnitude of complications, if the system cannot ensure a sound environmental integrity and 
equal access to the CDM. These issues are presented in the following sections. 
4.4 Baseline Methodologies, Additionality and Carbon Leakage 
At the heart of the environmental integrity issue of the CDM, lies the question of baseline 
methodology, and how it can be ensured that the emission reductions from a CDM project actually 
have occurred when compared to a counterfactual scenario. The environmental integrity of the 
CDM is threatened by the critique about the CDM emission reductions being based on dodgy 
accounting and unverifiable baseline assumptions i.e. the issues of additionality and methodology.  
The GEF tool i.e. the baseline methodology for RE grid connected CDM projects is used by more 
than half all CDM projects. It offers different baseline calculation methods, depending on the 
characteristics of the given electricity system and the availability of data, making the baseline for 
CDM projects questionable. The table below show a selection of CDM projects from the Central 
American region and their respective GEFs. 
Table 1 Selection of GEFs from Central America 
 
The table lists a selection of GEFs from CDM project in Central America, illustrating how the GEFs 
can vary. Source: IGES, 2013 
The above table lists GEFs from a selection of CDM projects in the region. The choice of GEF 
calculation method differs, depending on the energy mix of the electricity system and the data 
attainable. Since the GEF establishes the amount of CERs that can be issued to a given CDM 
project, the accuracy of the GEF is crucial to prevent an excessive issuance of CERs.  It is therefore 
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important to investigate how the GEFs accuracy can be improved. This will be discussed 
thoroughly in chapter 6 and 7. 
The issue of additionality, the uncertainty if a CDM project really has contributed to emission 
reductions, that would not have been possible without the contribution of the CDM, was 
presented in chapter 3. Carbon leakage can be explained as the increase in CO2 emissions outside 
Annex I country, when mitigation policies lead to the reallocation of production to regions with 
less stringent mitigation rules (IPCC, 2007). If GHG emitting practices move from a country with 
binding emission targets, to a country without targets, the country with targets will be able to 
show that emissions have decreased, while net emissions worldwide will not have changed. 
The issues of carbon leakage and additionality will probably continue to exist as long as market 
mechanisms allow the trade of GHG credits, between countries with binding emission reduction 
targets, and countries without a cap on their emissions. By agreeing on an emission cap on non-
Annex I countries, companies’ reallocation of GHG emitting practices would be restricted, as 
mitigation policies would be expected to come in place when a country would reach the cap for 
allowed emissions. There would also not be a need to prove additionality for CDM projects as a 
cap on emissions would ensure the maximum amount of allowed emission reductions. The CDM 
would then truly become a mechanism contributing to technology transfer and sustainable 
development, while ensuring GHG reductions.  
4.5 Towards a New Commitment Period 
The agreement to initialize National Appropriate Mitigation Actions7 (NAMA) in developing 
countries, during COP 16 in Copenhagen, is amongst the initiatives to get non-Annex I countries to 
take more action to limit their emissions. The recent Doha COP in December 2012 addressed the 
issue about the common but differentiated climate change responsibilities, and respective 
mitigation capabilities of countries. It established a work programme, on how to address an 
enhancement of Annex I countries’ emission reduction targets.  
                                                     
7
 Developing countries have agreed to implement NAMAs, with support from developed countries. NAMAs are aimed 
at achieving a deviation in emissions relative to 'business as usual' emissions in 2020, in the context of sustainable 
development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and 
verifiable manner (UNFCCC, 2013d) 
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These initiatives can be interpreted as a step in the right direction towards agreeing on targets for 
non-Annex I countries. A work programme on long-term finance has also been established, 
following the need to scale up climate finance, to achieve the joint goal of mobilizing US$100 
billion per year by 2020, to be provided to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) (IISD, 2012; TGO, 2013). 
To ensure a continuing effort in technology transfer, and common but differentiated climate 
change responsibilities, the GCF could be used as a financing institution for CDM projects. The GCF 
could also become a financial tool to balance the supply and demand of CERs, by financing CDM 
projects and acquiring CERs to stabilise the market. 
The Kyoto Protocol commitment period was to end in 2012, but it was decided that it will continue 
as of 1 January 2013. A new commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol has been launched, 
with the goal to adopt a new agreement by 2015. The CDM will also continue to exist in its current 
form, and all Annex I countries that have agreed on reduction targets, will have access to the 
market mechanisms throughout the second commitment period (UNFCCC, 2012b: 2). 
During COP 18, a work programme has been agreed upon, to elaborate a new market-based 
mechanism under the UNFCCC, and also set out possible elements for its operation (UNEP, 2012). 
It can be expected that the existing CDM governance, rules and procedures, will be used as a base 
for the upcoming market mechanism. The discussions in the work programme for new market 
mechanism are concerned with addressing the following issues: 
- How to ensure environmental integrity 
- How to assist in supporting NAMAs through the new market-based mechanism 
- How to enable conversion between different types of mechanisms 
- How to operationalise the relationship between the CDM and the new market-based mechanism, 
including how to  consider CDM activities when formulating baselines and crediting thresholds 
- How to incentivize investment, including from the private sector 
- How to address concerns about fraud in respect of market-based mechanisms 
- How to address leakage concerns in the recognition of net avoided emissions  
- How progress in elaborating the mechanism should correspond to progress in elaborating 
mitigation commitments 
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The issues that the work programme is addressing are some of the issues that have already been 
presented in the thesis. In addition, the discussion indicates that the CDM will continue to exist in 
the future, either as a parallel system to the new one, or as an integrated part. It is therefore 
important to continue addressing the issue of environmental integrity and increased access to the 
CDM, to enable more efficient climate change mitigation activities in developing countries. 
4.6 Summary 
The CDM or many of its elements will continue to exist in the future. Although, recent collapse of 
CER prices shows how the CDM cannot be an efficient climate change mitigation mechanism, 
when the conditions for trading are inadequate, and there is an excessive supply of CERs 
compared to demand. There is therefore a need to continue improving the CDM. An emission cap 
on non-Annex I countries, would prevent carbon leakage and the issue of additionality. The CDM’s 
claim of contributing to technology transfer and sustainable development, while ensuring GHG 
reductions could thus be strengthened.  
The use of baseline methodologies to ensure that the emission reductions from a CDM project 
actually have occurred, lie at the heart of the environmental integrity issue for the CDM. Since the 
largest part of CDM projects are grid connected RE projects, ways to improve the GEF tool should 
be considered. GEF calculations, a part of CDM compliance requirements contribute to transaction 
costs and complex compliance procedures which creates a barrier for an equal proportional access 
to the CDM by country. It is therefore necessary to make the compliance procedures more 
efficient, to lower transaction costs and increase the CDM’s environmental integrity. Ways to 
overcome these issues will be discussed further in chapter 6 and 7. 
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5 Electricity Generation and Power Integration in the Region  
In this chapter, the electricity sectors in the region are first presented giving an overview of the 
amount of electricity generated and the fuels used. This creates the base for GEF calculations in 
chapter 6. The chapter further investigates the expected electricity demand and the RE potential 
in the region, to assess if the demand in electricity generation can potentially be covered by RE 
resources. This justifies the GEF calculations’ assumption that all fossil fuel based electricity 
generation can potentially be displaced.  
The chapter also looks into the generation costs by source, assessing if RE is economically 
competitive with fossil fuels, making an argument for the potential displacement of fossil fuels 
from an economic perspective. Lastly, the transnational transmission infrastructure is presented, 
highlighting the development towards increased interconnection between electricity systems. The 
continuing increase in interconnectivity emphasises the need to analyse how the GEF calculations’ 
accuracy is jeopardised, by not calculating emissions from net imports of electricity. 
5.1 Electricity Generation 
The countries in the region have experienced a rapid economic growth in the last 20 years. 
Electricity generation in the region, critical for economic development, has also seen a steady 
growth to meet the growth in demand. With the increase in electricity demand and generation, 
the electricity sectors in the region have responded with a gradual differentiation of the energy 
mix, but also a growth of fossil fuel powered generation8 (CEPAL, 2012: 13; Martin, 2010: 2).  
The current situation draws a picture of a region with diverse electricity sectors. Mexico is the 
largest producer of electricity, with a total generation of 257.884 GWh in 2011, while Belize 
generated only 323 GWh in comparison. Belize has the largest hydroelectricity proportional 
capacity, followed by Costa Rica and Panama. By contrast, thermal power generation constitutes 
more than half of installed capacity in Honduras and Nicaragua. Mexico is the only country with 
nuclear power generation. Geothermal electricity generation has grown in overall importance in 
recent years and is concentrated El Salvador, Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Cogeneration has also 
increased in importance, especially in Belize, Guatemala and Nicaragua. Coal generation is 
                                                     
8
 To see a detailed description of the development of the electricity generation in the region from 2000-2011, see 
appendix I 
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concentrated in Mexico, Guatemala and Panama, while wind power generation is concentrated in 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua (CEPAL, 2000: 2; CEPAL, 2012: 21-38; ECA, 2010: 9).  
Table 2 Net Electricity Generation by Country and Source in GWh 2011 
 
The table illustrates the net electricity generation in 2011, by country and by source. The columns 
illustrate the percentage by source, while the table shows the amount of electricity generated. 
Source: CEPAL, 2012: 21-38; BEL, 2011: 38; SENER, 2012 
As illustrated in the figure above, Mexico’s electricity sector dwarfs the others’ having a large 
impact on the total share of electricity generation by source in the region. Hydroelectricity still 
plays a central role in electricity generation for most of the countries, with the exception of 
Nicaragua and Mexico.  
5.1.1 Expected Electricity Demand and RE Potential in the Region 
The electricity demand and electricity generation has been growing, and is expected to continue 
growing by 1.9% in Costa Rica,  2.2% in El Salvador, 2.7% in Guatemala, 2.8% in Honduras, 2.1% in 
Nicaragua and 2.5% in Panama (ECLAC, 2010:80). Belize expects to see an annual increase in 
electricity demand of 3% (BEL, 2011: 9), while Mexico’s increase in demand is expected to be 3,7% 
per year (SENER, 2010: 83, 138). 
 Table 3 Evolution of Electricity 
The table illustrates the prospected increase in electricity demand in the 
GWh. Sources: ECLAC, 2010: 80; Johnson et. al., 2009: 48
The above figure illustrates how the increase in 
from just above 250.000 GWh/y in 2010, to almost 400.000 GWh/y in 2050. This increase in 
demand will potentially lead to a large incr
the power sector follows the current trend. 
The countries in the region, apart from Mexico, are already dependent of import of hydrocarbons 
to cover electricity demand, making their economies exposed to volatile and risin
has not only affected the cost of energy but also the balance of payments, contributing to 
inflation, lower competitiveness of local industry, and depreciation pressures (World Bank, 2012; 
Johnson A., 2012: 4). Even Mexico which is highl
electricity generation is seeing its reserves being deployed
gas (Index Mundi, 2013b).  
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 To see a detailed description of the expected increase in electricity demand, see appendix III
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To address this challenge, ways at diversifying the region’s energy mix has been discussed, with 
emphasis on the utilizations of RE sources. Most countries have now national strategies, or have 
expressed intentions to include more RE sources in their energy mix (ECLAC, 2010:82; Ministry of 
Energy, 2010: 10; CEPAL, 2012b: 15-21; Martin, 2010: 2). The CDM can create an incentive to 
displace fossil fuel generated electricity with RE, contributing to a low-carbon development in the 
power sector.  
Fortunately, the region is rich in RE resources as hydro, geothermal and wind power, and there is 
an extensive RE potential for future electricity generation10. The total RE potential in the region is 
517.295 GWH/y of which 53% of the potential is hydropower, 32,4% is geothermal power and 
14,6% is wind power. Belize, El Salvador, Honduras and Panama are expected to see a deficit in 
electricity capacity, compared to the expected demand in 2050. The remaining countries are 
expected to have a surplus, resulting in a cumulative potential surplus in the region of 121.343 
GWh/y. The table below lists the RE potential of the respective countries, compared to their 
expected demand in 2050. 
Table 4 RE Potential and Expected Electricity Demand in 2050 
 
The table lists the cumulative hydropower, geothermal and wind power potential by country, the 
respective countries expected demand in 2050 and the RE potential/expected demand balance. 
Source: See appendix IV for the country assessments of their respective RE potential 
5.2 The Competitiveness of the Sources for Power Generation  
Even though the RE potential in the region can cover the expected demand, RE needs to be 
competitive with fossil fuels, for this to happen. Coal power generation has relatively high capital 
                                                     
10
 To see a detailed description of the respective countries’ RE potential, see appendix IV 
 42 
costs, but relatively low generation costs, due to relatively cheap fuel prices. Costs for coal 
powered electricity generation are between 10-11 US c/kWh11, but can be as low as 8-9 c/kWh 
(World Bank, 2012: iii). Diesel power generation has relatively low investment costs, but the fuel is 
relatively expensive, and oil prices are expected to grow. Prices for diesel generation are around 
26,4 c/kWh, but prices are subject to ongoing inflation and market price uncertainty (World Bank, 
2012: 15; IG, 2011: 2). Fuel oil power generation is a similar to diesel, but fuel prices are far lower, 
bringing costs down between 12 and 15 c/kWh12 (World Bank, 2012: iii, 15).  
Natural gas used in combined power plants is relatively cheap, with generation costs for natural 
gas being around 3,5 c/kWh13, making it amongst the cheapest electricity generation resources 
(ECLAC, 2004: 84). This technology is widely used in Mexico, as it has a large natural gas 
production. Costs are though expected to rise in the region over time, as Mexico is now a net 
importer of natural gas and its reserves are decreasing (SENER, 2010b: 141; Index Mundi, 2013b; 
EIA, 2013).  
Hydropower is already a vastly used power source in the region, and it is one of the cheapest 
options. Operating costs for hydropower are estimated to be between 7 and 8 c/kWh14, making it 
more competitive than all fossil fuel power sources except natural gas (World Bank, 2012: iii). 
Geothermal power is also in abundance in the region, due to the high amount of volcanic activity. 
The average operating cost of geothermal power is 7,2 c/kWh15 (World Bank, 2012: 13-14). Wind 
power in the region has the smallest potential in terms of power output, but it could still provide 
53.863 GWh/y, almost as much as the whole hydroelectricity generated in the region in 2011. 
Energy costs for wind power are between 3 and 8 c/kWh16, also highly competitive with most 
fossil fuels except natural gas (ECLAC, 2004: 84).  
RE energy sources are highly competitive with fossil fuels, except for natural gas, which is mainly 
used in Mexico. Mexico’s gas reserves are although decreasing and the country is already a net 
importer of natural gas. This will probably lead to an increase in prices in the future, making RE 
                                                     
11
 Assuming coal prices of 118 $/ton and capital costs of 3.000 $/kW 
12
 Assuming a 2010 oil price of 75 $/barrel and capital costs of 1.900 $/kW 
13
 Assuming average investment costs of 600 $/kW 
14
 Assuming capital costs of 2.500 $/kW 
15
 Assuming average capital costs of 4.000 $/kW 
16
 Assuming investment costs between 850 and 1.700 $/kW 
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sources more competitive. On the other hand, different electricity generation technologies have 
different investment and operational costs. This makes them more or less competitive in covering 
base- or peak-load electricity demand17, creating uncertainty regarding the possibility to achieve a 
fully RE electricity based dispatch.  
Increased electricity integration can though provide the means necessary to make RE more 
competitive in covering national peak-demands. By enabling electricity from RE power units which 
have lower marginal costs, to be transported between countries, increases the incentive for large 
scale projects and RE’s cost-effectiveness. The competitiveness of RE, in covering a larger share of 
fluctuating electricity demand can therefore be expected with the increased interconnection 
between the national energy systems. 
5.3 Increased Grid Integration 
International trade of electricity within the region was low in the past, due to a lack of capacity in 
cross border interconnections. The development of large scale projects and the efficiency of 
power generation in the region, except Mexico, have been hindered by the small size of the 
electricity markets in the individual countries. By the end of 2009 an interconnection between 
Mexico and Guatemala was established, paving the ground for a broader interconnection between 
the SIEPAC countries, Mexico and Belize (via Mexico). The connection between Mexico and Belize 
is characterized by a stable flow of electricity from Mexico to Belize. These interconnections have 
now in practice connected the eight countries’ electricity systems into one (CEPAL, 2010b: vi).  
The results of the increased interconnection can be clearly seen in the increasing amount of 
electricity exchange between the SIEPAC countries, and the amount of electricity imported into 
Guatemala, 496 GWh in 2011, 354 GWh in 2010 and only 19 GWh in 2009 (CEPAL, 2011: 15; 
CEPAL, 2012: 18; CNEE, 2010: 82). Belize is highly dependent on power imports from Mexico, 
historically covering around 50% of Belize’s total consumption. Belize’s dependency on imports 
has decrease during the last two years, due to a higher amount of produced electricity by 
hydropower and the use of bagasse for power production in Belize (CANU, 2011: 29). 
                                                     
17
 For more information on technological differences between the power sources see appendix II 
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Increased interconnection allows new strategies for electricity generation projects, enabling large 
scale projects, increasing efficiency, and levelling national supply deficits. For instance, even 
though Costa Rica has a vast amount of hydropower potential, there is little incentive to utilise the 
untapped resources from a cost-effectiveness perspective. A higher level of interconnection is also 
expected to result in increased competition and lower national electricity prices (CNE, 2011: 13). 
Thanks to the SIEPAC line construction, it can be expected that there will be a range of new 
opportunities, to benefit from the large RE power potential for export purposes. 
5.3.1 The SIEPAC Project 
The SIEPAC project was initiated to create higher efficiency levels through economic dispatch, 
shared reserve margins and shared demand and supply (ECA, 2010: 1). Already in 1987, there was 
a need for higher interconnection between the national electricity systems; a feasibility study of 
the project was effectuated, although construction didn’t start until 2006 (ECA, 2010: 4). The 
SIEPAC project consists of the installation of approx. 1.800 km of transmission lines, stretching 
from Panama to Guatemala. 
Figure 7 The SIEPAC Project 
 
The figure illustrates how the SIPEAC project will connect the region’s Central American electricity 
systems. Source: EPR, 2012 
 The project consists of 15 substations and 230KV high tension transmission lines, which will allow 
a transmission capacity of 300 MW in both directions. The project does also include
construction of infrastructure, to ensure th
2012). Most of the transmission lines are already operational, with 
Rica to be completed August the 31st in 2013.
5.3.2 Transmission Constraints, 
The GEF tool presents two criteria to assess if there are transmission constraints, to determine the 
boundaries of an electricity system:
transmission and distribution costs) of more than 5 percent between the systems
percent or more of the hours of the year;
of its rated capacity during 90% percent or more of the hours of the year (UNFCCC, 2012: 7). The 
needed information on the transmission line operation 
prices vary in the region; Mexico has the cheapest electricity prices of 108,4 $/MWh and 
Nicaragua has the highest, with 183,1 $/MWh.
Table 
The table illustrates the average electricity price in the 
CEPAL, 2010: 11; BEL, 2011: 7; SENER, 2012
The difference in electricity prices point to the fact that there
according to the GEF tool. On the other hand, with increased power integration, prices in the 
Central American countries are expected to decrease and become more homogeneous, as 
increased competition and additional projects w
figure below shows the prospected development of the annual marginal operational costs for 
electricity. 
at a second circuit can be built in the future (EOR, 
the last connection in Costa 
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5 Average Electricity Prices by Country 
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 Figure 8 Prospected Annual Marginal Operational Costs in the SIEPAC Countries
The figure illustrates the prospected annual operational costs of electricity in the respective SIEPAC 
countries from 2012 to 2026 in USD/MWh. Source: CNE, 2011: 67
The difference in costs is expected to decrease over time, as the respective countries’ electricity 
systems become more interconnected and complementary. 
Guatemala and Mexico became operational, t
increased, creating an overall flow of electricity from north to south
Table 6 Flow of Electricity North to South
The figure lists the flow of electricity in the 
2009, 2010 and 2011. Sources: CEPAL, 2010: 8;CEPAL, 2011: 15; CEPAL, 2012: 18; BEL, 2011: 38; 
SENER, CNEE, 2012: 17-21; CNEE, 2011:11
As illustrated by the above table, there has been an 
construction of infrastructure, allowing the transmission of more ele
countries. The flow of electricity from north to south has especially increased, with cheaper 
electricity flowing in from Mexico. 
recent years, it can be expected that electricity transmission between the countries will continue 
 
Since the connection between 
he amount of electricity flow out of Mexico 
.  
 and South to North in the Region,
region directed north to south and south to north
-13; CNEE, 2010: 12-13 
increase in the flow of electricity, with the 
ctricity between the 
Following the development of electricity exchanges in the 
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to increase. A higher proportion of cheap electricity from Mexico will further drive prices in the 
SIEPAC countries down, pushing for more competition and new projects with low marginal costs 
for electricity generation. The increase in electricity transmission further emphasises the need to 
ensure that the GEF tool does not lead to erroneous calculations of emission reductions related to 
electricity exchange. This issue will be assessed in chapter 6. 
5.4 Summary 
The national electricity systems and power sources differ notably between the countries in the 
region. All countries are expected to experience an increase in electricity demand during the next 
decades, from 265.211 GWh/y in 2010, to 391.141 GWh/y in 2050. There are enough RE sources in 
the region to cover demand, but they are not sufficient in each nation, to cover demand in 2050. 
The national supply deficit can although be covered, by electricity exchanges between the 
countries.  
RE sources are highly competitive with all fossil fuels, except natural gas. Although, an increase in 
gas prices in the future can be expected. The interconnection and electricity exchange between 
the countries can further increase the competitiveness of RE. The amount of electricity exchange 
has been growing, since the needed infrastructure started coming into place. Especially, an 
increasing flow of electricity from north to south has been observed. The increased 
interconnection is expected to contribute to higher security of supply, more competition, enable 
large scale projects and lower electricity costs. On the other hand, it also emphasises the need to 
ensure that the GEF tool does not allow an excessive issuance of CERs, by not taking the effects of 
electricity exchanges into consideration. 
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6 National and Regional GEF Calculations 
The CDM offers an opportunity to direct finance into RE generation, but to ensure the system’s 
effectiveness and legitimacy, it is important to ensure that the amount of issued CERs does 
correspond to the emission reductions obtained by CDM projects. In this chapter the national GEF 
calculations will be presented. The regional GEF will then be calculated, followed by an analysis on 
how the national GEFs differ from the regional GEF, and how the choice of including electricity 
exchanges, influence the potential issuance of CERs. The GEF calculations allows to assess the 
potential impact of carbon finance on the competitiveness of RE. The calculation will also enable 
the discussion in chapter 7, on how different GEF calculation methods lead to different carbon 
finance potentials, and how this will influence the choice of calculation method of stakeholders at 
the national and project level.  
6.1 National GEF Calculations  
In the following, the national GEF calculations18 will be presented using three different calculation 
methods. First, the GEF accounting for only national electricity generation is calculated, followed 
by the GEF calculation including electricity imports, using the exporting country’s GEF to calculate 
additional CO2 emissions. The GEF including CO2 emissions from electricity imports, but 
subtracting CO2 emissions from electricity exports  is then presented, using the exporting country’s 
GEF, to calculate CO2 emissions. 
6.1.1 GEF Calculations for Belize 
322.230 MWh of electricity was generated in Belize in 2011, emitting 6.004 t CO2; in 2010 a total 
of 323.294 MWh were generated, emitting 9.463 t CO2; in 2009 Belize generated 256.580 MWh, 
emitting 50.166 t CO2. The GEF for the reference years was thus 0,01863 tCO2/MWh in 2011, 
0,02926 t CO2/MWh in 2010 and 0,02926 t CO2/MWh in 2009. Following the calculations, the 
weighted average GEF for Belize, excluding electricity import and export is 0,0811 t CO2/MWh.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
18
 To see a detailed tables and access the excel sheets with GEF calculations see appendix V. 
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Table 7 Belize’s GEF for 2009, 2010 and 2011 
 
The table shows the CO2 emissions from electricity generation in Belize for 2009, 2010 and 2011, 
and GEF for the respective years. Source: Carqueija, 2012:  19 
The GEF tool requires also the inclusion of electricity imports in the GEF calculation. The GEF from 
the imported electricity can be calculated to be 0 tCO2/MWh, or the GEF of the exporting grid. As a 
choice of 0 t CO2/MWh GEF for electricity imports would decrease the potential obtainable CERs, 
project developers will have an incentive to use the GEF of the exporting grid in the calculations. 
The GEF changes substantially when electricity import is included in the calculations. Belize’s 
electricity imports from Mexico, where 170.612 MWh in 2011, at a GEF of 0,2139 tCO2/MWh; 
159.876 MWh were imported in 2010 at a GEF of 0,2103 tCO2/MWh; and 216.233 MWh were 
imported in 2009 at a GEF of 0,2216 tCO2/MWh. By including these imports, the weighted average 
GEF rises up to 0,1276 t CO2/MWh.  
This means that the CO2 emissions for the electricity consumed in Belize must be higher than if 
only the emissions for electricity generated in the country are accounted for. This is also shown in 
the calculations; the average CO2 emissions generated in the country without imports are 21.878 t, 
while average emissions for electricity consumed in the country are 61.222,32 t, almost three 
times the amount from the nationally generated electricity. As Belize does not export electricity to 
Mexico, the GEF remains the same as the one where only import is accounted for, if imports and 
exports are included in the calculations. 
Table 8 Belize’s GEF by Different Calculation Methods 
 
The table lists the 3 year average GEFs depending on calculation method. 
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6.1.2 GEF calculations for Costa Rica  
In 2011, the total electricity generation was 9.748 GWh, 9.489 GWh in 2010, and 9.168 GWh in 
2009. The amount of GHG emitting resources used in electricity generation was 88.311,5 tons of 
diesel and 148.554,5 tons of fuel oil in 2011, 143.406 tons of diesel and 55.540 tons of fuel oil in 
2010, and 98.983,5 tons of diesel and 16.572,4 tons of fuel oil in 2009. This gives the following 
calculation: 
Table 9 Costa Rica’s CO2 Emission from Electricity Generation, 2009, 2010 and 2011 
 
The table shows the CO2 emissions from electricity generation in Costa Rica for 2009, 2010 and 
2011, based on standard NCV and CO2 emissions from diesel and fuel oil. Sources: CEPAL, 2012b: 
23; IPCC, 2006: 1.18-1.22; ARESEP, 2012; ARESEP, 2012b 
By dividing the amount of CO2 with the generated electricity, it is possible to calculate 3 year 
weighted average GEF (without imports), of 0,0580 tCO2/MWh. Costa Rica imports electricity from 
Panama and Nicaragua, which both have a higher GEF. The additional CO2 emissions calculated 
with electricity imports give a weighted average GEF of 0,0611 tCO2/MWh.  
To calculate the amount of CO2 “exported” from Costa Rica, the exports to Panama and Nicaragua 
are added and multiplied with the Costa Rican GEF of the respective year. Costa Rica exported 
114.095 MWh in 2011 with a GEF of 0,073 tCO2/MWh, 109.250 MWh in 2010, with a GEF of 0,063 
tCO2/MWh, and 119.984 MWh in 2009 with a GEF of 0,0379 tCO2/MWh. With the subtracted CO2 
emissions from export, the weighted average GEF including imports and exports of electricity 
increases to 0,0612 tCO2/MWh.  
Table 10 Costa Rica’s GEF by Different Calculation Methods 
 
The table lists the 3 year average GEFs depending on calculation method. 
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6.1.3 GEF Calculations for El Salvador 
In 2011, the total electricity generation in El Salvador was 5.729 GWh, in 2010 5.650 GWh, and 
5.445 GWh in 2009. The amount of GHG emitting fuels used in electricity generation was 1.868 
tons of diesel and 161.693 tons of fuel oil in 2011, 1.067 tons of diesel and 159.006 tons of fuel oil 
in 2010, and 1.734 tons of diesel and 218.427 tons of fuel oil in 2009. Following the GEF tool, this 
gives the following calculation, resulting in with a weighted average GEF of 0,0975 tCO2/MWh: 
Table 11 El Salvador’s CO2 emission from electricity generation, 2009, 2010 and 2011 
 
The table show the CO2 emissions from electricity generation in El Salvador for 2009, 2010 and 
2011, based on standard NCV and CO2 emissions from diesel and fuel oil. Sources: CEPAL, 2012b: 
23; IPCC, 2006: 1.18-1.22; SIGET, 2011: 23; UT, 2012 
 
El Salvador imports electricity from Guatemala and Honduras, both with a higher GEF. The 
additional CO2 emissions calculated with electricity imports give a weighted average GEF of 0,1032 
tCO2/MWh. If the CO2 emissions from export are subtracted they will contribute to increase El 
Salvador’s GEF, to a weighted average GEF of 0,1033 tCO2/MWh. 
Table 12 El Salvador’s GEF by Different Calculation Methods 
 
The table lists the 3 year average GEFs, depending on calculation method. 
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6.1.4 GEF calculations for Guatemala 
In 2011, 2010 and 2009 the electricity generation in Guatemala was 8.146.570 MWh, 7.914.090 
MWh, and 7.746.538 MWh respectively. Guatemala used three CO2 emitting resources in 
electricity generation, diesel, fuel oil and coal. The amount of fuel and the CO2 emission from 
electricity generation are listed in the table below.  
Table 13 Guatemala’s CO2 emission from electricity generation, 2009, 2010 and 2011 
 
The table show the CO2 emissions from electricity generation in Guatemala for 2009, 2010 and 
2011, based on standard NCV and CO2 emissions from diesel and fuel oil. Sources: CEPAL, 2012b: 
23; IPCC, 2006: 1.18-1.22; CNEE, 2012: 17-21; CNEE, 2011:11-13; CNEE, 2010: 12-13 
 
Following the data above, the GEF (without imports) for Guatemala is 0,24186 tCO2/MWh. 
Guatemala imports mainly electricity from Mexico at had a higher GEF, but also from El Salvador, 
which has a lower GEF. The higher GEF from Mexico contributes to a higher GEF in 2010 and 2011, 
when imports are included. In 2009, when Guatemala’s GEF was higher than Mexico’s, there was a 
decrease in GEF. El Salvador’s lower GEF contribute to a lower GEF in all reference years. The 
weighted average GEF including imports is 0,24193 tCO2/MWh, slightly higher than if imports are 
not included. The GEF increases to 0,24614 tCO2/MWh, if export of electricity is subtracted.  
Table 14 Guatemala’s GEF by Different Calculation Methods 
 
The table lists the 3 year average GEFs, depending on calculation method. 
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6.1.5 GEF calculations for Honduras 
In 2011, 2010 and 2009 the electricity generation in Honduras was 7.169.700 MWh, 6.765.100 
MWh, and 6.613.400 MWh respectively. The CO2 emitting resources in electricity generation 
where diesel, fuel oil and coal.  
Table 15 Honduras’ CO2 emission from electricity generation, 2009, 2010 and 2011 
 
The table show the CO2 emissions from electricity generation in Honduras for 2009, 2010 and 2011, 
based on standard NCV and CO2 emissions from coal, diesel and fuel oil. As amount of ton of coal in 
electricity generation is not available, but electricity generated with coal as source is, CO2 
emissions from coal are derived by average electricity generation of 1 MWh per 0,435925 ton of 
coal. Sources: BLM, 2012; CEPAL, 2012b: 23; IPCC, 2006: 1.18-1.22; ENEE, 2012; ENEE, 2010 
Following the above calculations, the GEF (without imports) is 0,3275 tCO2/MWh. Honduras 
imports electricity from El Salvador which has a lower GEF, and Nicaragua which has a higher GEF. 
All in all, the 3 year average GEF with electricity imports is lower than without imports, due to 
higher overall imports of electricity from El Salvador which has a lower GEF. This is even though 
the GEF with imports, and imports and exports in 2009 was higher, due to the fact that more 
electricity was imported from Nicaragua instead of El Salvador. The GEF including imports and 
export is the lowest, as the electricity generated in the country and exported has a higher GEF 
than the electricity imported from El Salvador.  
Table 16 Honduras’ GEF by Different Calculation Methods 
 
The table lists the 3 year average GEFs, depending on calculation method. 
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6.1.6 GEF calculations for Mexico 
Mexico generated 257.884 GWh in 2011, 241.506 GWh in 2010 and 233.472 GWh in 2009. The 
fossil fuels used for electricity generation were diesel, fuel oil, coal and natural gas. The amount of 
fossil fuels, their NCVs, emission factor, and related CO2 emissions for each reference year are 
listed below.  
Table 17 Mexico’s CO2 emission from electricity generation, 2009, 2010 and 2011 
 
The table show the CO2 emissions from electricity generation in Mexico for 2009, 2010 and 2011, 
based on standard NCV and CO2 emissions from coal, diesel, natural gas and fuel oil. Sources: 
SENER, 2012; IPCC, 2006: 1.18-1.22; BEL, 2011:38; CEPAL, 2012: 18 
Mexico’s weighted average GEF is 0,21527 tCO2/MWh. Mexico exports electricity to both 
Guatemala and Belize. The only import of electricity into Mexico during the reference years 
occurred in 2010, when a relative small portion of electricity was imported from Guatemala. The 
different GEFs are not strongly affected regardless of the inclusion of import or export, because of 
the relative large size of electricity generation in Mexico compared to import and export.  
Table 18 Mexico’s GEF by Different Calculation Methods 
 
The table lists the 3 year average GEFs, depending on calculation method. 
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6.1.7 GEF calculations for Nicaragua 
Nicaragua generated 3.777.655 MWh in 2011, 3.614.472 MWh in 2010 and 3.409.453 MWh in 
2009. The sources emitting CO2 in electricity generation were diesel and fuel oil, with fuel oil being 
the largest source of GHG emissions. 
Table 19 Nicaragua’s CO2 emission from electricity generation, 2009, 2010 and 2011 
 
The table show the CO2 emissions from electricity generation in Nicaragua for 2009, 2010 and 
2011, based on standard NCV and CO2 emissions from diesel and fuel oil Sources: CEPAL, 2012b: 
23; IPCC, 2006: 1.18-1.22; INE, 2012 
Based on the above amounts of electricity generated and CO2 emissions, the GEF amounts to 
0,4461 tCO2/MWh. Nicaragua’s electricity imports from Costa Rica and Honduras have a lower 
GEF, contributing to a lower GEF when electricity imports are included and also when imports and 
exports are considered in the calculations. 
Table 20 Nicaragua’s GEF By Different Calculation Methods 
 
The table lists the 3 year average GEFs, depending on calculation method. 
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6.1.8 GEF calculations for Panama 
Panama generated 7.714.990 MWh in 2011, 7.484.730 MWh in 2010 and 6.864.740 MWh in 2009. 
Three CO2 emitting sources were used in electricity generation, mostly diesel and fuel oil, with coal 
which was introduced in 2011. The electricity generation and fuel consumption gives the following 
GEF Calculations. 
Table 21 Panama’s CO2 emission from electricity generation, 2009, 2010 and 2011 
 
The table show the CO2 emissions from electricity generation in Panama for 2009, 2010 and 2011, 
based on standard NCV and CO2 emissions from diesel and fuel oil. As amount of ton of coal in 
electricity generation is not available, but electricity generated with coal as source is, CO2 
emissions from coal are derived by average electricity generation of 1 MWh per 0,435925 ton of 
Coal. Sources: BLM, 2012; CEPAL, 2012b: 23; IPCC, 2006: 1.18-1.22; ASEP, 2012 
The weighted average GEF for Panama is 0,1904 tCO2/MWh. Panama imports electricity from 
Costa Rica, which has a lower GEF, contributing to a lower GEF for Panama of 0,1892 tCO2/MWh, 
when electricity imports are included in the calculations. When electricity exports are also 
included in the calculations, the GEF decreases slightly more. 
Table 22 Panama’s GEF By Different Calculation Methods 
 
The table lists the 3 year average GEFs, depending on calculation method. 
 
 
 6.2 The Impact of Calculation Method on National GEFs
The presented national GEF calculations show how the different consumption of fuel in electricity 
generation affects the respective countries’ GEF. By presenting the national GEFs
imports, and imports and exports in the calculations, it is also possible to see how the GEFs 
change, according to how carbon intensive the imported electricity is, and by how carb
intensive the national generated electricity is in comparison. The 
summarized below. 
Table 23 National GEFs and Difference by
The table lists the respective countries’ GEF, 
included, and when both imports and exports are accounted for.
If imports and exports are included in the calculations, countries with a high proportion 
RE generation which import carbon intensive 
case for Costa Rica which exports electricity,
Nicaragua which both have a higher GEF. This leads to a higher GEF for Costa Rica when imports 
and exports are accounted for than if only imports or only its 
On the other hand, a country that has a higher GEF
electricity with would get a lower CE
Honduras and Costa Rica which both have a lower GEF,
and exports are accounted for. This leads 
incentive is so to speak transferred to the countries it exports to
 
 
GEFs and the changes in GEF are 
 Calculation Method
how the GEF changes when electricity imports are 
 
electricity would gain a higher GEF
 but also imports electricity from Panama and 
own generation is accounted for.
 than the countries it imports and exports 
R potential. Nicaragua for instance, imports electrici
 and will have a lower GEF when imports 
to a smaller incentive to implement 
. 
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ty from 
CDM projects, as the 
 6.3 Regional GEF Calculations and the Bigger Picture
The total electricity generation and 
64.231.907 tCO2 in 2011, 282.747 GWh and 58.452.178 t
59.911.750 tCO2 in 2009. This gives 
tCO2/MWh.  
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua would experience a negative change in GEF, while 
Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Panama would experience an increase in GEF. if only national 
electricity generation is accounted for, the highest negative impact would be e
Honduras, with a decrease of 0,233 CER/MWh in GEF, while Costa Rica would see the highest 
increase in GEF, by 0,155 CER/MWh. Mexico, having the largest electricity sector in the 
would be the least impacted by the 
Table 24 Difference from National to Regional GEF, 
The tables lists the 3 year average 
GEF and difference from national to r
in consideration, the table in the 
includes imports and exports. 
Some interesting details appear when
different electricity exchange accounts
included in the calculations, the amount of 
additional 253.039 tCO2 that have never been emitted. This happens because the addition of all 
the electricity imports in all countries, without subtracting exports, lead
electricity generation count than 
right table, it is easy to note that the total amount of emissions accounted for by the inclusion of 
both imports and export, is the same as the 
countries, even though national emissions change.
 
CO2 emissions in the region were 300.492 GWh and 
CO2 in 2010, and 272.976 GWh and 
a 3 year average of 60.865.279 tCO2, and a GEF of 0,2133 
regional GEF, with a small decrease of 0,002 CER/MWh. 
Including Imports and 
CO2  emissions for each country in the region, their respective 
egional GEF. The left table does not take electricity exchange 
centre includes electricity imports, and the table to the left
 the regional GEF is compared to the national GEFs, including
 between the countries. When only electricity imports are 
cumulative CO2 emission becomes 61.118.318 
s to a higher 
has actually occurred in reality. By comparing the left and the 
cumulative national electricity gene
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The additional 253.039 emissions correspond to a 0,41% increase. This might not seem as much, 
but it is reasonable to assume that 97% of all grid connected CDM projects worldwide use a 
methodology where historical national averages, including imports are used as base for GEF 
calculations (IGES, 2013). The total amount of CO2 emissions that are falsely assumed reduced, 
and the amount of CERs issued worldwide that should not have been issued, might therefore 
already be a considerable amount. 
6.3.1 Include or Exclude Electricity Imports and Exports 
The choice to include electricity imports has been made out of the assumption that additional 
electricity generation in an electricity system will displace electricity imports. Regarding electricity 
exports, additional RE electricity would on the other hand be expected to provide additional CO2 
neutral power available for export. By subtracting exports it would thus be assumed that power 
additions would not influence the exported electricity. The choice of not subtracting exports can 
therefore seem to be justified, but as the calculations have shown this is not the case.  
The presented rationale for why electricity exports are not to be subtracted in the GEF calculations 
highlights how the methodology was created with a project centred rationale, without taking a 
holistic approach into consideration. When a single project generates electricity, and the exact 
carbon intensity of the displaced electricity cannot be assessed (as the dispatch data analysis 
allows for, but is only used by 3% of all grid connected RE projects), the project centred approach 
must be set aside. When historical national averages on GHG emissions from electricity generation 
are used to define a national GEF, a holistic approach must therefore be used instead.  
Having established that GEF calculations accounting for only electricity imports do not ensure the 
environmental integrity of the GEF tool, the question remains if electricity exchanges and the 
related emissions are to be included in the calculations or not. It is mostly a question about if 
electricity generation or electricity consumption has to be the base for the calculations. If national 
electricity generation is the base for calculations, the GEF will award countries with carbon 
intensive electricity systems which export electricity. This will direct more carbon finance to 
carbon intensive electricity systems, incentivising more RE generation in the countries in question.  
On the other hand, if electricity exchanges are included in the calculations, countries which have a 
high share of RE, but consume large quantities of carbon intensive electricity from neighbouring 
 countries will be awarded. This will direct more carbon finance to countries who already have a 
high share of RE generation, but the increased incentive for RE will increase the incentive to utilize 
untapped RE sources, incentivise energy self
question that needs to be discussed further, and o
influence the discussion. It is although important to stress 
method across the region, or count
CER issuance. 
There is also another option to ensure the GEF tool’s environmental integrity, by taking a more 
conservative approach to the calculations. If imports are included in the calculations, but o
RE electricity exports are subtracted from the calculations, the GEF would be lower, while creating 
an additional incentive for the displacement of fossil fuels for electricity exports by RE.
6.3.2 National and Regional GEF
When assessing the consequences of an eventual change from national to regional GEF, it is 
relevant to evaluate the impact a change in GEF would have on the national incentives for RE 
generation. This becomes possible by 
the respective countries, with the changes in GEF from national to regional.
Table 25 RE Potential, Expected Demand / RE Potential and GEF Variation
The table lists the respective RE potential, expected electricity demand / RE potential in 2050, and 
the balance between the national and regional GEF.
The use of a regional GEF would 
Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua. Mexico is the country with the highest potential for RE and
-reliance and increase security of supp
pposed national interests will probably 
the need for consistency in calculation 
ries which exchange electricity to prevent excessive cumulativ
’s Incentive for Renewable Energy 
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could have a RE supply surplus compared to demand, a negative incentive for RE is thus not a 
positive outcome if RE is to be promoted in the region. On the other hand, the change in GEF for 
Mexico is so minimal, that it would not have a significant impact on the economic incentive for RE. 
Nicaragua has also a potential RE supply surplus, but is the country that would experience the 
most negative change in GEF. On the other side of the spectrum, Costa Rica has the second largest 
potential RE surplus and would experience a positive increase in GEF.  
Since the size of the GEF, combined with the price for CER has an impact on the incentive for RE 
investments, there will be some national interests opposing the use of a common GEF. On the 
other hand, the countries in the region wish to create a healthy competition between the national 
electricity sectors, by increasing the interconnectivity of their electricity systems. Differentiated 
national incentives for power generation, created by different GEFs should therefore also be 
avoided. The use of a common GEF could also lower transaction costs for project developers, 
lowering one of their most evident economic barriers. The advantages of using a common GEF 
could hopefully convince the respective countries to find solutions to compensate for the GEF 
difference. Different national interests and the possibility to lower transaction costs will be 
discussed more thoroughly in chapter 7. 
6.3.3 Potential CERs and Incentive for RE Electricity Generation 
Assuming a CER price of 0,18 €/tCO2 and a regional GEF of  0,2133 CER/MWh, additional RE 
electricity generation  would not create a substantial enough amount of carbon finance, to have a 
decisive influence on the choice of energy source in any of the countries. RE is already fairly 
competitive, compared to fossil fuels except natural gas. Average cost for electricity generation in 
the region ranges from 26 €/MWh for natural gas, 56 €/MWh for hydro, 54 €/MWh for 
Geothermal and 41 €/MWh for wind power19. CER prices need to be at 70,3 € for wind power to 
be competitive with natural gas, 131 € for geothermal power, and 140,6 € for hydropower, 
assuming a GEF of  0,2133 CER/MWh. 
CER prices have historically surpassed the 30 € mark, but would need to be even higher to have a 
serious impact on the competitiveness of RE over natural gas in the region. As shown by the 
calculations, the current GEF tool leads to a potential excessive issuance of CERs. Extra CERs in 
                                                     
19
 US$ prices converted to € www.oanda.com. Rate date 01.03.2012, month of the publication of the source.  
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circulation will only contribute to a CER depreciation which would further hinder the effectiveness 
of the CDM. As different options to control supply and demand are discussed, the issue of only 
including imports needs to be addressed, to limit CER supply and increase the environmental 
integrity of the CDM. 
6.4 Summary 
The national GEF calculations done with three different approaches allowed the identification of 
the excessive issuance of CERs, caused by including electricity imports and not exports in the GEF 
calculations. 253.039 CERs could potentially be issued in the Central American Region, without 
emissions having occurred. When national historical averages are used to calculate the GEF, a 
holistic approach on GHG emissions must be used, instead of applying a project centred rationale.  
The regional GEF calculations led to an average GEF for all the countries of 0,2133 tCO2/MWh. The 
use of a regional GEF would have a negative impact on Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and 
Nicaragua, and a positive impact on the remaining countries. The size of the GEF has an impact on 
the incentive for CER investments, and there will be opposing national interests on the choice 
between regional or national GEFs. The same is the case between the choice to include or exclude 
electricity exchanges in the calculations. An alternative is to take a conservative approach that 
would ensure environmental integrity and further disincentivise the use of fossil fuels for 
electricity exports, by including electricity exchange, but not include RE exports in the calculations. 
This would lower the national GEF in cases where carbon intensive electricity is used for export. 
Either way, the choice needs to consistent to ensure that an excessive issuance of CERs does not 
occur. Taking into account the recent efforts to establish a common electricity market to increase 
competition and lower electricity costs, the choice of the regional GEF over different national GEFs 
seems preferable, as a regional GEF would create an equal incentive for RE throughout the region. 
Lastly, current CER prices do not influence the competitiveness of RE electricity significantly. This 
undermines the efficiency of the CDM as a market mechanism to reduce emissions. As different 
options to control supply and demand are discussed, the issue of only including imports in the GEF 
calculations needs to be addressed, to limit CER supply and increase the environmental integrity of 
the CDM. 
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7 Transnational Climate Governance Solutions 
In the previous chapter, the thesis calculating GEFs based on historical averages for GHG emissions 
from electricity generation, only including electricity imports, leads to an excessive issuance of 
CERs. In this chapter, the different stakeholders and their respective governance functions 
relevant for grid connected CDM project governance are mapped. This enables the discussion on 
where the responsibility for the environmental integrity of the GEF calculations should be 
delegated. The chapter also analyses the potential for better governance, to ensure uniformity in 
GEF calculations, and lower transaction costs for project developers. This thesis draws on two 
main cases, the Indian Central Electricity Authority (CEA), where the Indian GEFs are centrally 
calculated; and a GEF study on the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), where the regional GEF 
was calculated.   
7.1 CDM Governance 
Governance of the CDM is divided between the following different actors: project participants i.e. 
investors and project developers; the designated national authority (DNA), the host country’s CDM 
authority with the task of approving the projects, and evaluating if the project contributes to 
sustainable development; the designated operational entity (DOE), the independent entities that 
validate project documents (PDD) against CDM requirements, and verify emission reductions; and 
the CDM Executive Board (EB), the governing body of the CDM, which is responsible for validation 
of methodologies, project registration and CER issuance. The main stages of a CDM project’s 
lifecycle and the involvement of the different actors are illustrated below: 
Figure 9 CDM Project Lifecycle 
 
PP: project proponent, DNA: designated national authority, DOE: designated operational entity, EB: 
CDM Executive Board, LoA: Letter of Approval by DNA. Source: Shishlov & Bellassen, 2012: 7 
 The project lifecycle gives an overview of the governance 
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The figure illustrates the different governance functions of CDM stakeholders at different 
governance levels and their respective functions.
Following the above illustration, 
actors at the different governance levels. 
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it is possible to delegate different tasks to the appropriate actors to improve CDM governance for 
grid connected RE projects. This will be done in the following sections. 
Project Developers, Interests and Functions 
Project developers have the responsibility to establish a GEF for a given project and they can be 
expected to seek maximisation of the potential CER income from the project in question 
(Michaelowa, 2011: 3). If there is a possibility to choose between different GEFs, the choice will 
always fall on the most advantageous. Project developers in countries with a high portion of RE 
generated electricity would prefer a common GEF as baseline, as it would increase their CER 
potential; while project developers in countries where the national GEF is higher than the regional, 
will lose CER income by applying a regional GEF. Project developers can therefore not be expected 
to implement calculation methods ensuring environmental integrity. 
The regional GEF should only be applied if it is used as baseline by all CDM projects in the same 
region. If projects in countries with a high national GEF used the national GEF, while projects in 
countries with a low national GEF used a regional GEF (higher because influenced by the other 
countries’ emissions), a double count of emission reductions would occur. The choice between 
calculation methods, or between a regional or national GEF need to be consistent, and neither can 
be left to the single project developer nor at the single country level.  
Project developers also have an interest in minimising costs. While the CDM opens up for new 
income generation opportunities, there are also relative high transaction costs involved 
(Michaelowa, 2012:1). Project Design Document (PDD) development, the stage where GEF 
calculations need to be effectuated, is recognised as the main driver for transaction costs (Boyle 
et. al., 2009: 18). The time and resources spent calculating the GEF is the same if it is small or a 
large scale CDM project. Since the fixed cost heavily influences the entire cost, this leads to an 
incentive towards economies of scale and large scale projects (IGES, 2013b). This incentivises large 
scale projects with high CER returns, creating a barrier for smaller CDM projects.  
Another way to minimise costs could be through the sharing of data. Since GEFs are mostly 
calculated based on historical data (except for the dispatch data analysis), in theory, the GEF 
calculated in the same country using the same reference years should be the same. There is 
therefore a high potential to achieve economies of scale in GEF calculations, by using the same 
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data as base for more CDM projects. A project developer, who has already calculated the GEF, 
could in this way also become a service provider for a whole year, for other project developers.  
National Interests and the DNAs Functions 
DNAs are responsible for the national approval of CDM projects and the approval of the project’s 
contribution to sustainable development in the country. As a national entity DNAs have national 
interests, and will probably be influenced by national policies. Energy security, competitiveness, 
and foreign capital inflow are issues that will influence DNAs decision. Energy security ensures an 
efficient production and reliable energy services; the competitiveness of the electricity sector 
ensures lower production costs and revenue from electricity trade; and inflow of foreign capital in 
the electricity sector increases competitiveness, and alleviates the need for national investments 
in infrastructure.  
CER income has a positive influence on all the above factors, and since the current GEF tool only 
has positive national impacts on these issues, DNAs cannot be expected to take action to change 
the GEF tool. On the other hand, nations will have an interest in attracting CDM projects, which 
creates an incentive to alleviate transaction costs for project developers. Twenty countries21 are 
already calculating their national GEFs centrally, making them publicly available to ensure 
uniformity, and lower transaction costs for project developers (Michaelowa, 2011: 6, 7). By having 
one entity responsible for GEF calculations, transaction costs drop. The total costs of GEF 
validation by a DOE, should also be expected to be lower, as one validation per yearly updated 
version of the GEF, would suffice for all projects.  
The Role of the Executive Board 
The EB is responsible for the CDM methodologies and has an interest in the success of the CDM, 
thus also its environmental integrity, and the access to the CDM from as many countries as 
possible. The EB has tried to cut transaction costs for project developers since the CDM came into 
existence, by creating standardised baselines so each project developer would not have to develop 
their own methodology.  
                                                     
21
 Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, China, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Peru, Rwanda, 
Singapore, Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam 
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On the other hand, the EB needs to balance between having simple enough compliance rules, to 
incentivise an equitable distribution of CDM projects, and strict enough to ensure environmental 
integrity. Having the rule setting function for the CDM, the EB must have the task to address the 
issue of the potential excessive CER creation by using the GEF tool. The EB will have to ensure that 
the methodology is revised, to ensure a higher environmental integrity and restrain excessive CER 
supply.  
7.1.1 Additional Regional Governance Level 
Concerning grid connected RE electricity projects in the region, another governance level arises, 
caused by the increased interconnection between the countries’ electricity systems. This makes 
the governance of the CDM in the region increasingly complex. The regional electricity system 
adds a series of actors that are relevant to the governance of grid connected RE projects.  
The SIEPAC project has caused the formation of several transnational networks. The Empresa 
Proprietaria de la Red (EPR) was established to own and operate the SIEPAC transmission 
infrastructure, and control the market for electricity exchanges between the countries. The EPR is 
a public-private consortium of electric companies, INDE (Guatemala), CEL and ETESAL (El 
Salvador), ENEE (Honduras), ENATREL (Nicaragua), ICE and CNFL (Costa Rica), and ETESA (Panama). 
In addition, there are three foreign shareholders CFE (Mexico), Endesa (Spain) and ISA (Colombia) 
(EPR, 2012b). 
The Mercado Eléctrico Regional (MER), the regional competitive electricity market for the SIEPAC 
is the transnational electricity market, consisting of firm and non-firm market contracts at a 
supranational level. The Ente Operador Regional (EOR) is the entity directing and coordinating the 
operation of the regional power system in the SIEPAC, and administrates the MER (ECA, 2010: 17, 
18; EOR, 2013; EPR, 2012b). The Central American Integration System (SICA) is a central actor 
promoting power integration, which led to the implementation of the SIEPAC project (ECA, 2010: 
34). SICA is the institutional framework of Regional Integration in Central America, created by the 
States of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, where 
Mexico has the role as observer. 
Between all these actors forming transnational networks at the national and supranational levels, 
steering, rule setting, capacity building and implementation, and information flow must be 
 essential to allow the system to function efficient
functions these actors have can potentially 
connected CDM projects. The potential CDM governance for grid connected RE projects in a 
regional context, with substantial electricity exchange can be illustrated as follows:
Figure 11 Regional CDM Governance for Grid Connected RE projects
The figure illustrates the increased complexity of CDM governance in a regional context, the 
stakeholders involved and their respective functions
In the conglomeration of actors involved in the electricity sector in the 
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lower transaction costs for potential CDM project developers in the 
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7.2.1 Indian GEF Calculations by the Central Electricity Authority 
India was the first country to centrally establish an official GEF baseline. The CEA started 
calculating the GEF for its electricity systems in 2006, where there were four delimited electricity 
grids, but with transmission capacity to allow electricity exchange. The country saw the high 
potential for CDM projects, and started calculating the GEFs of the electricity systems centrally, to 
ease the access for project developers, but also to ensure uniformity in the calculations. The 
established GEF database is updated each year and includes data on CO2 emissions from all grid 
connected power stations. The uniformity and the governance of the calculations enhanced the 
GEF acceptability, and expedited the project approval process (CEA, 2006: ii, S-1, 1). 
The Indian power sector has also gone through a process of increased interconnection between 
the different electricity systems. By improving transmission and interconnection infrastructure, 
India now has two electricity grids compared to four in 2006. From 2006 to 2011, the weighted 
average emission factors and operating margins of each system were adjusted for inter-regional 
and cross-border electricity imports and exports (CEA, 2006: 11). After the GEF methodology 
changed in 2011, the CEA OM calculations stopped including exports in the calculations over the 
electricity exchange between the systems (CEA, 2013: 13). As shown in chapter 6, this potentially 
leads to an excessive CER issuance and should be avoided, but as nations follow national interests 
and the rules formulated by the EB, they cannot be expected to include exports in their GEF 
calculations. 
Another aspect of national CER maximising rationale can be seen in the CEA GEF calculation from 
2006. The CEA present the argument that power stations registered as CDM activities may have to 
be excluded from GEF calculations for the duration of their crediting period, to avoid a lower GEF 
to subsequent CDM project activities (CEA, 2006: 6). This argument might seem justified, assuming 
that all CDM projects are additional to a business as usual scenario. On the other hand, all new 
CDM projects would show that they displace electricity with a higher GEF than in reality, which 
would result in credited emission reductions that would not have occurred. In the current GEF 
tool, CDM projects need to be included in OM calculations (UNFCCC, 2012: 10). This should 
continue to be the case in the baseline methodology. 
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The choice to centrally administer the GEF calculations in India, show how a different governance 
of CDM procedures can increase the mechanism’s efficiency, and potentially its environmental 
integrity by ensuring GEF uniformity. In addition, it is relevant to note that China does also 
calculate and publish the GEFs for its regional grids (Michaelowa, 2001: 6). These countries hold 
the largest share of CDM projects, and although many factors influence CDM investments, the 
availability of uniform GEF calculation mitigate risks and transaction costs for project developers, 
and creates a common ground for the competition between CDM project developers. 
7.2.2 GEF Calculations for the South African Power Pool 
The SAPP was established with the same rationale as the SIEPAC project, to enable the 
development of a competitive electricity market (SAPP, 2013). A study was performed in 2011 to 
examine how to develop national and a regional GEFs for the Southern African Region (GFA 
Envest, 2011: 2). This case has direct parallels to the case chosen in this thesis, as a common GEF 
between different countries is calculated. Lessons learned from this case provide useful insights to 
the challenges that may arise from the increased governance complexity. 
The African Energy Ministers declared the need to support regional strategies and 
transformational projects to secure sustainable, efficient and affordable energy supply, based on 
economies of scales and diversification of the energy mix. Many African countries, although having 
a large RE potential, lack capital and investment incentives to take advantage of their RE potential. 
The CDM is seen as a mechanism, although not being effective under current CER prices, to 
potentially minimise capital and investment barriers, by incentivising RE electricity generation 
(GFA Envest, 2011: 8). The GEF calculations were therefore made to increase the access to the 
CDM for the SAPP countries. 
As for the Indian CEA GEF calculations, the SAPP calculations follow the GEF tool and do include 
electricity imports but do not account for exports (GFA Envest, 2011: 24). The difference between 
the two cases becomes apparent from the governance complexity when several countries are 
involved. One of the steps of the CDM project cycle consists of the DNA’s host country approval. 
When a CDM project uses a regional GEF, the question arises concerning the national approval 
process.  
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A CDM EB decision from 2006 states that a CDM project covering more than one country (which 
becomes the case if a regional GEF is used), requires a Letter of Approval (LoA) from each host 
country (GFA Envest, 2011: 67). The need for a project developer to get a LoA from all countries in 
the region can only be expected to prolong the approval process, create uncertainty and increase 
transaction costs. The SAPP report suggested that while still having to get a LoA from the host 
country, the approval from the countries where a given CDM project is not physically 
implemented could be delegated to a regional entity.  
To delegate the authority to partially approve CDM projects to a regional entity, would limit 
transaction costs, but will not necessarily improve environmental integrity. Project developers in 
countries with a lower GEF than the regional will use a regional GEF, gaining approval from the 
host country and the regional entity. On the other hand, project developers in countries where the 
national GEF is higher than the regional, will use the national GEF without having to get approval 
from the regional entity. If a regional GEF is used, there must be an agreement between all the 
countries involved, that only the regional GEF will be used, and DNAs will have to refer project 
developers to the regional GEF to get approval. As discussed in chapter 6, the use of a regional GEF 
would be the preferred solution in a regional electricity market, to ensure common competition 
rules and lower transaction costs. 
7.3 Proposed CDM Governance Functions for the Regional Stakeholder Networks 
Parallels can be drawn from the SAPP to the SIEPAC project. Utilities from the respective countries 
(except Belize) have come together to create an open and regional market for electricity. In the 
SAPP report, the SAPP was identified to be the appropriate entity to calculate and update the 
regional GEF. In the Central American region, the EOR is the equivalent of the SAPP, in charge of 
directing and coordinating the operation of the regional power system in the SIEPAC, and 
administrate the MER (ECA, 2010: 17, 18; EOR, 2013; EPR, 2012b). 
EOR has access to data on the power generation and power exchanges between the countries 
(EOR, 2013), and is the obvious transnational network with the needed prerequisites to calculate 
and update the regional GEF. The EOR would therefore have to expand its transnational 
governance functions, to include CDM information sharing, and capacity building and 
implementation of the GEF calculations. This new task will lead to additional costs for the EOR. If 
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the costs have to be carried by the EOR, by CDM project developers, or by the respective countries 
will have to be discussed further between the stakeholders.  
The EOR is a regional organization, affiliated to the institutional framework of Regional Integration 
in Central America (SICA), which includes the States of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, and where Mexico has the role as observer. It can be expected 
that the EOR could be influenced by national interests. It is imperative that all countries involved 
have agreed on only using these calculations, that all future RE grid connected CDM projects from 
the region uses the GEF calculations made by the regional entity, and that the calculations do not 
allow for an excessive issuance of CERs as presented in chapter 6. The EB will therefore have to 
review an eventual request of methodology approval for a regional GEF by the EOR, or any other 
regional entity given the task of GEF calculations, and ensure that the above conditions are met. 
The DOEs will on their side have to validate and verify that the GEF calculations comply with the 
new regional GEF calculation rules. 
The question still remains on how to agree on the use of a regional GEF, and which entity can be 
delegated the function to approve projects for the countries where the project is not physically 
implemented. In the region, the EPR is the consortium of the countries’ and their public and 
private utilities (except Belize), together with the Spanish Endesa and the Colombian ISA, which 
have interests in the region’s transmission infrastructure. Both the countries and their respective 
private and public utilities will have different interests in the choice of GEF. Since the choice of GEF 
needs to be consistent, the process of adapting a regional GEF might be hindered by opposing 
interests.  
The EPR is although an appropriate transnational network to be used as forum to discuss which 
GEF to use, and eventually how countries that would experience a lower GEF could be 
compensated. It is also a potential stakeholder to be delegated the authority to issue LoAs for the 
countries where a given CDM project is not physically implemented. The EPR will have to assume a 
new governance function, as a rule setting network for grid connected CDM project governance.  
The choice of the EPR has though one limitation by the fact that Belize would not be a part of the 
governance process. The participatory system must be transparent, and allow access to all 
relevant stakeholders in the decision making process, in order for the governance of the system to 
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be credible, and achieve the needed legitimacy (Michaelowa, 2012: 6). Belize must therefore be 
included in the decision making process. This opens up for the possibility for another transnational 
network to be the most appropriate for rule setting on the GEF issue.  
The Central American Integration System (SICA), which was one of the main drivers for the SIEPAC 
project, includes the States of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Panama, and Mexico has the role as observer. This transnational network of actors could also be 
an appropriate candidate, possibly securing more legitimacy for grid connected CDM project 
governance than the EPR. SICA is also an obvious stakeholder to be delegated the authority to 
issue LoAs for the countries, where a given CDM project is not physically implemented.  
7.3.1 Creation of an Information and Discussion Forum for the Relevant Stakeholders 
The choice of transnational network institutions to be delegated the GEF calculation and the LoA 
approval tasks, will have to be decided between the respective countries and relevant 
stakeholders. The SAPP report offers a series of recommendations on how the decision making 
process could be initiated, by implementing workshops for information sharing and discussions 
(GFA Envest, 2011: 70, 71).  
A CDM workshop or a series of them should be held, with representatives from DNAs, Ministries 
of Energy, power utilities and the relevant regional transnational networks, to provide information 
on the advantages and implications of using a regional GEF. The workshop(s) should inform and 
stress the need to increase environmental integrity of the CDM and limit transaction costs for 
project developers, and the need for consistency and uniformity in GEF calculations. They should 
also present the need to establish or delegate parts of CDM governance to the most appropriate 
new or existing regional stakeholders. The issue of financing the new task of calculating the 
regional GEF will also need to be addressed.  
The need for cooperation from the power utilities to enable the collection of reliable and correct 
data on electricity generation, fuel consumption and power stations efficiency must also be 
highlighted. A detailed database could enable the GEF calculation with a higher accuracy. This is 
for instance the case in Brazil, which calculates the GEF centrally, allowing for the use of the 
dispatch data analysis GEF; the GEF calculation method which is the most accurate in calculating 
emission reductions by a given project. Finally, this forum should also work on strategies to inform 
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regional and national stakeholders on the new carbon finance opportunities enabled by the 
utilization of the regional GEF. 
7.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the different governance function of the relevant actors to grid connected CDM 
projects have been presented, followed by a presentation of the increased governance complexity 
emerging by the involvement of several actors with different interests, when a regional GEF is 
used. It has been concluded that the EB must be in charge of changing the methodology and 
ensure that countries with electricity exchange need to be consistent in the choice of 
methodology. The EOR has been identified as the appropriate transnational stakeholder to 
calculate and update the regional GEF, with support from public utilities. SICA has been identified 
as the most appropriate candidate to be delegated the authority to issue LoAs for the countries 
where a given CDM project is not physically implemented.  
The chapter recommends that a series of workshop should be held, with representatives from 
DNAs, Ministries of Energy, power utilities and the relevant regional transnational networks, to 
inform about the advantages of using a regional GEF, the issues that arise from the choice of GEF, 
and to assign new CDM governance responsibilities to the appropriate stakeholders. Finally, the 
chapter emphasizes future possible advantages the change in governance and increased 
cooperation could bring about, by potentially leading to increased accuracy of GEF calculation and 
a higher overall environmental integrity for the CDM. 
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8 Summary and Conclusions  
The collapse of CER prices raises questions about the CDM’s effectiveness as a climate change 
mitigation mechanism. The CDM’s current conditions for trading are inadequate, and there is an 
excessive supply of CERs compared to demand. An emission cap on non-Annex I countries, would 
create better conditions for trading, prevent carbon leakage and resolve the issue of additionality, 
by ensuring the maximum cumulative amount of allowed emission reductions in the CDM. Recent 
discussions during the COPs point towards a higher commitment on climate change mitigation 
from non-Annex I countries, which can be seen as a first step in the right direction. Further on, the 
CDM or many of its elements will continue to exist in the future emission trading mechanism. 
Therefore, it will still be imperative to ensure that the CDM maintains a strong environmental 
integrity, and that the access to the mechanism is facilitated to allow equal country participation.  
8.1 Revision of the GEF tool 
The use of baseline methodologies to ensure that the emission reductions from a CDM project 
actually have occurred, lie at the heart of the environmental integrity issue of the CDM. When 
national historical averages are used to calculate the GEF, a holistic approach on GHG emissions 
must be used instead of applying a project centred approach. The inclusion of electricity imports in 
GEF calculations, without accounting for electricity exports pose a potential risk for a double 
counting of electricity generation, with related CO2 emissions in GEF calculations. This is of high 
relevance since more than half of CDM projects are grid connected RE projects.  
By calculating the national and regional GEF of the countries in the Central American region, the 
potential excessive CER creation becomes evident. When the data is gathered to calculate the 
regional GEF, it is clear that the inclusion of imports and not exports allows an excessive issuance 
of CERs, for reductions that do not occur in reality. The calculations for the region show that there 
is a total excessive CER potential of 253.039. As different options to control CER supply and 
demand are discussed, the issue of only including imports needs to be addressed, to limit CER 
supply and increase the environmental integrity of the CDM.  
Concerning the choice of database for the GEF calculations between national electricity generation 
or the inclusion of electricity exchange, the environmental integrity is the same but different 
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national interests arise. The only requirement to prevent an excessive issuance of CERs and 
unequal rules for project developers is to be consistent in calculation method across 
interconnected countries.   
When national historical averages are used as base for GEF calculations, either national electricity 
generation should be used as database, or national electricity generation, including GHG emission 
related to electricity imports, and subtracting electricity and GHG emission related to exports. An 
alternative is to take a conservative approach, by including electricity exchange, but not include RE 
exports in the calculations. This would ensure environmental integrity and further disincentivise 
the use of fossil fuels for electricity exports, by lowering the national GEF in cases where carbon 
intensive electricity is exported. 
8.2 Increased Interconnection and GEF Calculations Results in the Region 
The interconnection and electricity exchange between the countries in the region has been 
growing, and is expected to increase with the further development of the SIEPAC transmission 
project. The increased interconnection is expected to contribute to higher security of supply, more 
competition, enable large scale projects and lower electricity costs. There is therefore a will to 
create a system with equal competition, and overcome individual national interests, to harvest the 
potential for economies of scale and lower costs. There are enough RE sources in the region to 
potentially displace all fossil fuels and cover expected electricity demand for decades to come. 
There might be a supply deficit in some countries which can be covered through electricity 
exchanges from countries with a supply surplus.  
The GEF calculations resulted in a regional GEF of 0,2133 CER/MWh. A regional GEF would have a 
negative impact on Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua, and a positive impact on the 
remaining countries.  
 
 
 
 Table 25 RE Potential, Expected Demand / RE Potential and GEF Variation
The table lists the respective RE potential, expected electricity demand / RE potential in 2050, 
the balance between the national and regional GEF.
Even though there will be some opposing interests in the choice of GEF, the use of only one 
common GEF could ensure an equal competition between the national electricity sectors, and 
lower transaction costs for project developers in the Region. These advantages exceed national 
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increase competition and lower electricity costs, the choice of the regional GEF see
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how a different governance of GEF calculation procedures can lower transaction costs. Centrally 
calculated GEFs can also enhance the CDM’s environmental integrity and an equal competitive 
ground for project developers by ensuring GEF uniformity; assuming that the methodology has 
been revised to not allow an excessive issuance of CERs, by only including electricity imports in the 
calculations. 
In relation to the Central American Region, the EOR has access to data on power generation and 
power exchanges between the countries, and is the obvious transnational network with the 
needed prerequisites to calculate and update the regional GEF. The EB will have to review an 
eventual request of methodology approval for a regional GEF. It is imperative that the EB ensures 
that all countries involved have agreed on only using these calculations, and that all future RE grid 
connected CDM projects from the region use the GEF calculations made by the regional entity. The 
DOEs will on their side have to validate and verify that the GEF calculations comply with the new 
regional GEF calculation rules. 
The need for a project developer to get a LoA from all countries in the region if a regional GEF is 
used can only be expected to prolong the approval process, create uncertainty, and increase 
transaction costs. SICA seems to be the most appropriate candidate to be delegated the eventual 
authority to issue LoAs for the countries where a given CDM project is not physically implemented, 
as all the countries in the region are represented in this transnational network. 
To start addressing the issues of opposing interests in the choice of GEF, and delegation of 
different governance functions to different transnational network entities, a workshop or a series 
of them should be held. The workshops should bring together representatives from DNAs, 
Ministries of Energy, power utilities and the relevant regional transnational networks, and provide 
information on the advantages and implications of using a regional GEF.  
The workshops should inform and stress the need to increase environmental integrity and limit 
transaction costs for the CDM, and the need for consistency and uniformity in GEF calculations. 
They should also present the need to delegate CDM authority to make GEF calculations and issue 
LoAs, to the most appropriate regional stakeholders. The issue of financing the new task of 
calculating the regional GEF will also need to be addressed. The need for cooperation from the 
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power utilities to enable the collection of reliable and correct data on electricity generation, fuel 
consumption and power stations efficiency must also be highlighted. 
A detailed and coordinated database could enable the calculation of GEF with a much higher 
accuracy, as provided centrally by Brazil, allowing for the use of the dispatch data analysis GEF, 
which ensures the utmost accuracy on electricity dispatch and actual emission reductions by 
additional generated electricity. This forum should also work on strategies to inform regional and 
national stakeholders on the new carbon finance opportunities, enabled by the utilization of the 
regional GEF. 
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Perspectives  
The UNFCCC work programme to elaborate a new market-based mechanism has been established 
to amongst other things address how to ensure environmental integrity, and to incentivise 
investments into climate change mitigation actions. It can be expected that the existing CDM 
governance, rules and procedures, will be used as a base for the upcoming market mechanism. In 
the thesis, the issue of the potential excessive issuance of CERs through the application of the GEF 
tool, and the GEF calculation’s transaction costs for project developers have been presented. The 
possible solutions to these issues presented in the thesis will hopefully provide some constructive 
input on the discussion on how the CDM can be reformed.  
As the availability of data led to some simplifications and restrictions on the accuracy of the GEF 
calculations in the thesis, additional thorough research on the potential excessive CER creation 
through the application of the GEF tool should be considered. As shown in Table 1 Selection of 
GEFs from Central America, the emission factors in the selection of 5 couples of CDM projects 
registered the same year in the same country had notable differences in GEF. The reason behind 
this difference and the potential excessive issuance of CERs caused by the chosen calculation 
method should be assessed.  
The findings of the thesis bring forward another issue. Most CDM projects establish their GEFs at 
the time of application. The tool gives two options for the use of the GEF calculation for crediting. 
One is the ‘ex ante’ option, where the calculations are done once at the validation stage, without 
the need to monitor or revalidate the GEF during the projects crediting period. The ‘ex post’ 
option on the other hand requires an annual update of the GEF. According to a sample of CDM 
projects, only 5% of projects uses the ex post option (IGES, 2013).  
Project developers who expect an increased GEF over time will therefore choose the ex post 
option. On the other hand, if it is assumed that as a result of more CDM projects and climate 
change mitigation efforts being implemented the GEF will decrease over time, project developers 
will chose the ex ante option. If the GEF decreases over time and an ex ante option has been 
chosen, most CDM projects will still use the GEF that has been calculated at the time of 
application, and will be credited CERs for 7 or 10 years using a possibly higher GEF than in reality.  
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The used of the dispatch data analysis GEF calculation is the most accurate calculation method, 
and uses an ex post approach. To assess the possibility of excessive CER creation in reality, a 
comparative study between comparable CDM projects, using the dispatch data analysis GEF and 
other methods based on historical averages should be performed. This could shed more light on 
the magnitude of the GEF tool’s issues presented in the thesis, and the issue of using an ex ante 
approach for CER crediting.  
Only 3% of all RE grid connected projects use the dispatch data analysis method. Project 
developers have originally the task of calculating the GEF, but they are constrained by transaction 
costs and the availability of data. They have therefore difficulties in applying the dispatched data 
analysis GEF to calculate emission reductions. Increased grid integration and regional GEF 
calculation collaboration would further lower transaction costs for project developers. The use of 
increased involvement of different actors with data accessibility to calculate and make the 
dispatch data analysis GEF accessible should therefore be encouraged.  
GHG inventories, national communications and low-carbon development strategies have already 
become an integrated part of countries effort to address the issues of climate change. As we are 
moving towards a new commitment period, there is a need to ensure that climate change 
mitigation measures in the energy sector are accurate and accountable. The clear advantages in 
terms of increased environmental integrity and economic effectiveness of GEF calculations being 
performed centrally and continuously updated should therefore be stressed and encouraged.  
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 Appendix I Historical Power Generation
Belize 
Electricity Generation by Source, 2000 
Thermal = fuel oil and diesel, cogeneration = biomass (bagasse)
The figure illustrates the development of electricity generation in GWh by source in the Belizean 
electricity system, from 2000 to 2011. Sources: BEL, 2000: 29; BEL, 2011: 38; Canu, 2011: 30, 
Costa Rica 
Electricity Generation by Source, 2000 
Thermal = fuel oil and diesel, cogeneration = biomass (bagasse)
The figure illustrates the development of electricity generation in GWh
electricity system, from 2000 to 2011. Source: CEPAL, 2012: 21
 by Country, 2000-2011 
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- 2011 in GWh
 
 by source in the Costa Rican 
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 El Salvador 
Electricity Generation by Source, 2000 
Thermal = bunker fuel and diesel, cogeneration = biomass (bagasse)
The figure illustrates the development of electricity generation in GWh by source in El Salvador, 
from 2000 to 2011. Source:CEPAL, 2012: 25
Guatemala 
Electricity Generation by Source, 2000 
Fuel oil = bunker fuel and diesel, cogeneration = b
The figure illustrates the power generation by source in Guatemala from 2000 to 2011. Source: 
CEPAL, 2012: 28 
 
- 2011 in GWh 
 
 
- 2011 in GWh 
iomass (bagasse) 
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 Honduras 
Electricity Generation by Source, 2000 
Fuel oil = bunker fuel and diesel, cogeneration = biomass 
The figure illustrates the power generation by source in Honduras from 2000 to 2011. Source: 
CEPAL, 2012: 32 
Mexico 
Electricity Generation by Source, 2000 
Fuel oil = bunker fuel and diesel, Combined cycle = mainly gas powered plan
The figure illustrates the power generation by source in Mexico from 2000 to 2011. Source: SENER, 
2012 
- 2011 in GWh 
(bagasse) 
- 2011 in GWh 
ts
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 Nicaragua 
Electricity Generation by Source, 2000 
Fuel oil = bunker fuel and diesel 
The figure illustrates the power generation by source in Nicaragua from 2000 to 2011. Source: INE, 
2012 
Panama 
Electricity Generation by Source, 2000 
Fuel oil = bunker fuel and diesel 
The figure illustrates the power generation by source in Pa
2012 
- 2011 in GWh 
- 2011 in GWh 
nama from 2000 to 2011. Source: ASEP, 
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Appendix II Technology Differences and Economic Consequences 
The choice of technology has economic consequences for the way in which electricity is generated 
to maximise economic efficiency. This has consequences on how the different power units will be 
dispatched. RE energy sources differ from fossil fuel sources in both utilization possibilities and 
marginal operational costs. Marginal costs for fossil fuel generated electricity tend to be low for 
the first power generated, as lower investment costs influence the marginal cost, and tend to 
decrease with the amount of power generated, closing in on the price for fuel used in power 
generation. RE sources on the other hand, tend to have higher marginal operational costs at the 
start, as they require a larger amount of upfront investments, while the marginal cost steadily 
decreases, as no expenses for fuel is needed.  
Screening Curve Annualized Cost per kW 
 
HFO=Fuel Oil #6; MSD HFO=Medium Speed Diesel Motors; T=Turbine; GO=Gas Oil;  
FO#4=Fuel Oil #4 
The figure illustrates how the annualized cost changes with power plants capacity factor. Source: 
World Bank, 2012: 16 
As illustrated by the figure above, different power sources have different effectiveness, to cover 
different electricity demand. These factors have influence on how different power units are 
 dispatched. When new power units are constructed, they change the
This will change the dispatch order, displacing some electricity generation from certain sources, 
The figure above illustrates the cost associated with the dispatch of a kW for different 
technologies according to plants capacity
associated costs increase with the capacity factor, while they remain quite stable for the RE 
sources. On the other hand, the fossil fuel technologies have a low initial capital cost at zero 
capacity factor, which increases with increase in electricity generation, due to fuel consumption. 
This shows that the RE sources are 
due to its fluctuating nature), while fossil fuel technolo
peak demand.  
Dispatch Order of Different Technologies
The figure illustrates an exemplified dispatch order for different power units, to cover fluctuation in 
demand. Source: World Bank, 2012: 17
As illustrated by the figure above, standard dispatch uses energy sources with low increase in 
marginal costs (RE) for base load, while combustion turbines (diesel
cover peak demand. It is therefore a challenge to achieve a fully RE based e
economic point of view. Increased interconnection opens up possibilities to increase the amount 
of electricity generation, lowering RE’s marginal costs, thus
  
 nature of the energy mix. 
 factor. As it is clearly depicted, for fossil fuel plants the 
usually suited to cover base load (this is not the case for wind, 
gies are generally more suited to cover 
 
  
 and fuel oil) is usually used to 
lectricity supply by an 
 enabling higher effectiveness for RE. 
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Appendix III Prospected Electricity Demand by Country 
Taking the current development of increasing energy demand and increased dependency on 
imported fossil fuels for electricity generation, the future prospect of the electricity sector in the 
region draws an alarming picture. Following this development, the electricity demand in the 
region will increase from 265.211 GWh in 2010, to 391.141 GWh in 2050. This extensive increase 
in electricity demand is also expected to put a considerable amount of stress on the energy 
sources used for electricity generation. According to published baseline scenarios, the amount of 
fossil fuel expected to be used for electricity generation in the region is expected to grow 
extensively during the coming decades (ECALC, 2010: 79-81; Johnson et. al., 2009: 19). 
As electricity demand increases, the countries in the region, except Mexico, are expecting to see a 
proportional decrease in hydroelectricity generation in their energy mix, from 50% in 2008 to 26% 
in 2100; geothermal from 8% to 5% and cogeneration from 4% to 3%. The energy sources that are 
expected to see an increase in proportion are coal, from 3% to 23%; natural gas, used in combined 
cycle, from 1% to 27%. The only RE resource expected to see an increase in proportion is wind 
energy, from 1% to 3%. In total, the proportion of renewable energy sources is expected to 
decrease from 63% to 36% by 2100, under the current trends (ECLAC, 2010: 81). This projection in 
RE utilization is made assuming that respective countries will continue expanding RE generation, 
reaching the utilization of approximately 50% of the hydroelectric potential, and 90% of their 
geothermal potential in the year 2100, not considering solar and bio-fuel generation and a wind 
electricity generation expansion based on current trends (ECLAC, 2010: 77). 
Mexico, having the largest electricity sector in the region is expecting a high increase in coal and 
gas generated electricity (Johnson et. al., 2009: 19). Taking the prospected amount of increase 
fossil fuel consumption in electricity production, the emissions from the electricity sector in 
Mexico are expected to rise from 142 Mt CO2 in 2008, to 322 Mt CO2 in 2030. The remaining 
countries’ collective emissions are expected to rise from 25,5 million tons CO2 in 2007, to 363,3 
million tons CO2 in 2100 (ECLAC, 2010:82). Even if these numbers do not raise a positive picture 
for the future electricity sectors in the region, both in terms of dependency of fossil fuels and 
climate change abatement, it is important to note that there are other development efforts being 
implemented, to push electricity sector development in other directions. 
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Mexico is planning to expand its RE generation proportion and further improve efficiency with the 
expansion of combined cycle generation (SENER, 2010: 163). In 2007, the respective countries’ 
Energy Ministers and the Central American Integration System (SICA) set out a strategy to achieve 
a sustainable development in the sector, consider an increase of the participation of RE, and 
improvements in the use and supply of energy (ECLAC, 2010: 82). To achieve these goals, there 
will be a need to increase the amount of RE based electricity generation, but the nature of the 
separate national electricity systems pose some challenges to utilize the RE energy potential in the 
region, and utilize the resources in an efficient way. The gradual unification of the countries’ 
respective grids into one regional grid, where electricity can be transported between countries is 
enabling a higher efficiency in electricity generation and opens new opportunities in the utilization 
of the region’s untapped RE resources. 
Evolution of electricity demand with baseline scenario 2010-2050 in GWh/y 
 
The table illustrates the prospected increase in electricity demand in the region, from 2010-2050 in 
GWh (assuming a 3,7% annual increase for Mexico). Sources: ECLAC, 2010: 80; Johnson et. al., 
2009: 48 
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Appendix IV RE Potential in the Region 
RE Potential in the Region 
 
The table lists the respective countries’ RE potential by source in GWh/y. 
RE potential in Belize 
Hydropower potential 
Belize’s estimated unused hydropower capacity is approximately 40 MW (Canu, 2011: 38-39), 
almost 42% of the country’s total electricity generation capacity. The total hydroelectricity 
capacity of Belize is thus 72,7 MW, with a potential power generation of approximately 556 
GWh/y, more than the current total demand. Belize has thus the potential to become fully self-
sufficient when it comes to electricity. Although, it is important to note that the construction of 
hydropower plants also have negative effects on the local environment. Due to climate change, 
rainfall patterns might also change in the future, causing variations in the hydropower potential. 
Wind power potential 
The country has several sites with the right conditions for wind power generation. The potential 
capacity at the most promising site is estimated to be 20 MW (Canu, 2011:40). It is not an easy 
task to estimate what the potential electricity output would be, but assuming that the conditions 
for wind energy are similar to Honduras (REVE, 2013), the expected output would be 
approximately 23 GWh/y. Belize has no relevant potential for geothermal power generation.  
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RE potential in Costa Rica 
Hydropower potential 
Costa Rica has a high potential that is not yet utilised. According to the Costa Rican Ministry of the 
Environment, Energy and Telecommunications (MINAET), the total potential for hydropower in 
Costa Rica is of 6.377 MW corresponding to a potential of 32.533,5 GWh/y .(MINAET, 2009:108). 
Geothermal Potential 
The total potential for geothermal electricity in Costa Rica is of 235 MW, or 1647 GWh, excluding 
the potential for geothermal plants in natural parks and protected areas (ECLAC, 2004: 34). 
According to the MINAET, the total potential for geothermal electricity production is of 800 MW, 
corresponding to 5606,8 GWh/y (MINAET, 2009: 108). 
Wind Power potential 
Wind power resources are abundant on several sites, with higher generation potential during 
spring, which complements lower hydro generation during the same period (MINAET, 2009: 108). 
The total estimated potential for wind energy in the region ranges from 600 MW, giving a total 
potential of 1.840,1 GWh/y (MINAET, 2009: 108). Construction of wind farms is quite 
straightforward, with little environmental impact, compared to other RE sources. The challenging 
aspect is its fluctuating nature, and the lack of storage options (MINAET, 2009: 108). 
RE Potential in El Salvador 
Hydropower potential 
The hydropower potential in El Salvador is estimated to be 2.165 MW or 9.483 GWh/y. 
Considering that the installed capacity in country is approximately 474,2 MW, there are still vast 
amounts of hydropower that can be utilised in the future. El Salvador plans to decrease drastically 
the amount of fuel oil used for electricity production to only 4% in 2017, more than a 40% 
decrease (CNE, 2011: 57). Several alternative resources are being discussed, from natural gas and 
geothermal power, but hydropower will also definitely play an important role, due the large 
amounts of available hydro resources in the country. 
Geothermal Potential 
El Salvador is the country in the region with the highest share of geothermal generated electricity 
in its electricity system. In 2011, 24% of generated electricity was geothermal, amounting to 1.430 
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GWh. Even though geothermal energy is already widely utilised, the total potential is estimated to 
be 333 MW, or 2.039 GWh/y (ECLAC, 2004:34). 
Wind Power Potential 
Information regarding the total wind power potential for El Salvador is not available at the 
moment, but a 42 MW that has the potential to generate 128,8 GWh/y is considered for 
construction (CNE, 2011: 41).  
RE potential in Guatemala 
Hydropower Potential 
Guatemala has approximately 900 MW of hydropower capacity, and has an overall estimated 
hydropower potential is 10.890 MW, with the capacity to generate 47.698 GWh/y (ECLAC, 2004: 
33). Having only exploited approximately 2% of the total hydropower potential, Guatemala has the 
possibility to become self reliable on electricity, and a net exporter instead of importing electricity 
from Mexico as is the case at the moment (CNEE, 2012: 23). 
Geothermal Power Potential 
Guatemala has also a large potential for geothermal power. The country has a capacity of 49 MW 
installed at the moment, the lowest of the geothermal generating countries in the region, while 
having a potential of 800 MW, or 4.906 GWh/y. 
Wind Power Potential 
There are no official studies on the total wind power potential in Guatemala available at the 
moment, but there are 10 out of 16 monitored areas in the country with high potential for 
generating wind power. The country is planning a public international bid for the installation of 
800 MW, which could provide 2.133,3 GWh/y of electricity (REVE, 2012). 
RE potential in Honduras 
Hydropower Potential 
Honduras plans to supply 80% of total electricity demand in 2022 with hydropower. The country’s 
hydropower potential is 5.000 MW, corresponding to an annual generation of 26.280 GWh 
(Energia Renovable Honduras, 2012; ECLAC, 2004: 35). 
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Geothermal Potential 
Honduras doesn’t have any geothermal power generation at the moment, but a 35 MW project is 
planned to become operational in 2013. The identified geothermal power potential in Honduras, is 
only 125,3 MW, one of the lowest in the region, (Energia Renovable Honduras, 2012b). This 
corresponds to 768,5 GWh/y. Even though the geothermal potential in the country is amongst the 
lowest in the region, it could still provide almost 7% of the current installed capacity. 
Windpower Potential 
The current windpower capacity installed is of 102 MW, which generated 116,7 GWh of electricity 
in 2011. The potential for wind power in the country is estimated to be 500 MW, which could 
generate 572 GWh/y (Energia Renovable Honduras, 2012c; ECLAC, 2012:32). 
RE potential in Mexico 
Hydropower Potential 
Mexico’s installed hydropower capacity amounts to 11.499 MW, which generated 35.796 GWh in 
2011. The country’s hydroelectricity potential is almost five times higher, estimated to be 53.000 
MW (SENER, 2009: 70), able to generate approximately 165.000 GWh/y, the highest hydropower 
potential in the region. 
Geothermal Potential 
Mexico has an installed geothermal capacity of 964,5 MW, which generated 6.507 GWh in 2011. 
Although having the highest installed capacity in the region, it amounts to only 2% of the potential 
capacity in the country. The estimated capacity for geothermal power is 20.000 MW, a large 
potential, able to provide 146.351 GWh/y (SENER, 2009: 77-78).  
Windpower Potential 
Windpower holds the smallest share of electricity generation, compared to other power sources, 
but there are already plans to expand the total capacity. The total capacity potential is estimated 
to be 11.000 MW in the country, considering only areas with the most favourable conditions 
(SENER, 2011: 67). Assuming the existing efficiency of wind power generation in the country, it 
gives a potential generation of 41.149 GWh/y. 
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RE potential in Nicaragua 
Hydropower Potential 
Only 5% of the total hydropower potential in Nicaragua is currently exploited. The total 
hydropower capacity potential is 2000 MW, with the potential to provide 6.628,7 GWh/y of 
power, far exceeding the country’s current demand (ECLAC, 2004: 33; ARN, 2011: 3). 
Geothermal Power Potential 
As with hydropower, Nicaragua has a large share of unused geothermal potential, and one of the 
largest geothermal potential in the region, amounting to 1.500 MW. 1.500 MW of geothermal 
capacity could generate 9.198 GWh/y, covering the country’s electricity needs, and provide 
income through electricity exports (ECLAC, 2004: 34; ARN, 2011: 3). 
Wind Power Potential 
Nicaragua has several sites that offer good opportunities for wind power generation. The country 
has an installed capacity of 63 MW, 8% of its total identified wind power potential, estimated to 
be 800 MW, with the potential to generate 2.675 GWh/y (INE, 2012; ARN, 2011: 3). 
RE potential in Panama 
Hydropower potential 
Panama has recently increased its hydropower capacity with the construction of a new 
hydropower project with a total capacity of 223 MW, almost 10% of the total capacity installed in 
2011. The estimated hydropower potential in Panama is 2.341 MW, with the potential to generate 
10.254 GWh of electricity per year. There also seems to be a political will to increase the share of 
RE; Panama’s president announced the 9th of July 2012 that the country has the potential to 
generate all its electricity with RE resources by 2015. This can be called a bold statement, but it 
shows a clear sign of political willingness towards a low-carbon development (Energia Renovable 
Panamá, 2012). 
Geothermal Power Potential 
As we descend south in the Central American Region, the amount of volcanic activity diminishes 
(Smithsonian, 2012), therefore the geothermal potential in Panama is the second lowest in the 
region, amounting to only 40 MW, or 245 GWh/y (ECLAC, 2004: 34). 
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Wind Power Potential 
Panama has no wind power generation, but eight proposals for wind power supply to the national 
electric transmission company have being submitted recently (Energia Renovable Panamá, 2012b). 
The total estimated wind power potential in the country is 400 MW, which could provide 1.226,7 
GWh/y of power (ECLAC, 2004: 33-34). 
 
  
 Appendix V GEF Calculation Tables and Excel Sheet CD
GEF calculations for Belize 
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GEF calculations for Costa Rica 
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 GEF Calculations for El Salvador 
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 GEF Calculations for Guatemala 
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 GEF Calculations for Honduras 
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 GEF Calculations for Mexico 
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 GEF Calculations for Nicaragua 
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 GEF Calculations for Panama 
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